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NEUTRAL NO MORE:  SECONDARY EFFECTS 
ANALYSIS AND THE QUIET DEMISE OF THE 
CONTENT-NEUTRALITY TEST 
Mark Rienzi* & Stuart Buck** 
 
When the Supreme Court introduced the “secondary effects” doctrine to 
allow for zoning of adult businesses, critics fell into two camps.  Some, like 
Justice William Brennan, predicted dire consequences for the First 
Amendment, particularly if the doctrine was used in political speech cases.  
Others, like Professor Laurence Tribe, predicted secondary effects analysis 
would be limited to sexually explicit speech and would not threaten the 
First Amendment.  The modern consensus is that the doctrine has, in fact, 
been limited to cases about sex. 
Recent cases demonstrate, however, that the impact of the secondary 
effects doctrine on the First Amendment has been broader and more 
insidious than is generally understood.  It is true that courts usually avoid 
expressly invoking the doctrine outside the adult speech context, instead 
applying the standard content-neutrality analysis.  But that “standard” 
neutrality analysis has actually been quietly warped over the past three 
decades by the influence of the secondary effects doctrine.  These doctrinal 
distortions have occurred without anything like the outcry generated by the 
prospect of express use of the doctrine in political speech cases. 
The results of this doctrinal shift are striking, with some courts treating 
as “neutral” laws that deliberately discriminate among speakers and 
messages on public sidewalks, in issuing parade permits, and even in what 
political messages can be worn on T-shirts. 
This Article (1) describes the manner in which the standard neutrality 
analysis has been warped by the secondary effects doctrine, 
(2) demonstrates the dangerous First Amendment effects of those changes 
by examining several recent cases in which courts have allowed content-
based or even viewpoint-based speech restrictions to stand, and 
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(3) explains how the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts can and should 
correct this serious First Amendment problem. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nearly three decades ago, in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 
the U.S. Supreme Court introduced the “secondary effects” doctrine into the 
First Amendment’s content-neutrality analysis.1  Under this doctrine, the 
Court upheld a law imposing zoning requirements on an adult-themed 
movie theater as “content neutral,” even though application of the law 
turned entirely on the content of movies shown.2 
The decision was greeted with sky-is-falling pronouncements of the 
danger to the First Amendment.  Justice William Brennan wrote that the 
“dangers and difficulties posed by the Renton analysis are extensive” 
because “secondary effects offer countless excuses for content-based 
suppression of political speech.”3  Geoffrey Stone observed that the 
doctrine “threaten[ed] to undermine the very foundation of the content-
based/content-neutral distinction” and “in turn erode the coherence and 
predictability of first amendment doctrine.”4 
Renton offered a possible silver lining—perhaps the secondary effects 
doctrine would be limited to sexually explicit speech, and therefore not 
endanger the political speech that lies at the core of the First Amendment’s 
protections.  At the time, Laurence Tribe wrote, “The Renton view will 
likely prove to be an aberration limited to the context of sexually explicit 
materials.”5  Kathleen Sullivan expressed the same view years later, 
explaining that the secondary effects doctrine is used in the context of 
sexually explicit speech to “uphold otherwise content-based statutes whose 
political counterparts would readily be struck down.”6  Modern 
commentary suggests most scholars agree that the secondary effects 
doctrine has been largely cabined to sexually explicit speech.7 
 
 1. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). 
 2. See id. at 54–55. 
 3. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 4. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 116–
17 (1987); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and 
Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 293 n.145 (1987) (“[I]f taken seriously as a 
statement of first amendment law, [Renton] would effectively eviscerate the concepts of 
‘time, place and manner,’ ‘content neutrality,’ and ‘narrow tailoring.’  It is reasonable to 
hope that the distortions introduced in that opinion will apply only to the category of 
‘sexually explicit materials’ . . . .”); Andrea Oser, Motivation Analysis in Light of Renton, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 344, 350 (1987) (noting that commentators “fear that Renton marks a 
gutting of the first amendment”). 
 5. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-3, at 799 n.17 (2d ed. 
1988); see also Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit Legislative Motive in the Municipal Land Use 
Regulation Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 95 (1988) (“Although the Court never explicitly 
affirms the view that sexually explicit expression is a generally less valuable form of speech 
(and that the plurality position in American Mini Theatres now commands a majority of the 
Court), no other explanation of Renton is plausible.  The protection provided the regulated 
speech in Renton is so limited and so easily circumscribed that the case’s holding must be 
narrowly construed.”). 
 6. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sex, Money, and Groups:  Free Speech and Association 
Decisions in the October 1999 Term, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 723, 730 (2001). 
 7. See, e.g., Joshua P. Davis & Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Inherent Structure of Free 
Speech Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 131, 137 (2010) (“[T]he ‘secondary effects’ test 
is best understood as a way to give sexual speech less protection than more highly valued 
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The core claim of this Article is that this dominant view is wrong.  
Although courts have generally avoided express use of the secondary 
effects doctrine in political speech cases, the doctrine has had a powerful 
distorting effect on the traditional content-neutrality analysis that lies at the 
heart of much of the Court’s free speech analysis.  These changes to the 
traditional neutrality test have created precisely the First Amendment 
problems feared by Renton’s early critics.  Yet they have done so rather 
stealthily, without anything like the attention initially attracted by Renton 
itself, and without any of the outcry that would have accompanied the 
widespread express use of the secondary effects doctrine in political speech 
cases. 
The result is that courts today are more likely to uphold expressly 
content-based restrictions on core political speech—and even viewpoint-
based8 restrictions on such speech—than they were before Renton.  In the 
past few years, this has resulted in federal courts deeming “neutral” 
government attempts to discriminate among speakers based on their 
messages on public streets and sidewalks, in parade permitting schemes, 
and even in which political T-shirts they may wear.9 
We believe three doctrinal developments are responsible for this shift.  
First, the very existence of the secondary effects doctrine suggests to courts 
and governments that, at least in some instances, a law can be deemed 
neutral and acceptable if it has a neutral purpose, even if the application of 
the law itself is actually content based.  This occurs primarily, but not 
exclusively, in cases concerning sex-related speech. 
Second, courts historically required a law to be “justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech” before it could be treated 
as content neutral.10  When properly applied, this inquiry requires a critical 
review of the government’s asserted interest to determine whether that 
interest is related to content in any way.11  Over time, and in reliance on 
Renton, courts have largely deemed the “justification” inquiry satisfied any 
time a government even names a neutral interest, regardless of whether the 
justification is triggered only by speech of a particular content.  This change 
makes the “justified without reference” prong of content analysis virtually 
powerless to protect against selective government regulation of speech, 
even in the realm of political speech. 
 
speech.”); John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291, 
293 (2009) (“The good news . . . is that courts generally do not apply the secondary effects 
doctrine to most forms of protected speech.”). 
 8. As the Supreme Court has explained, viewpoint discrimination is “an egregious form 
of content discrimination.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
829 (1995) (“When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by 
speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.  
Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.” (citing 
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992))). 
 9. See infra Part III.B. 
 10. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771 (1976). 
 11. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984). 
2013] NEUTRAL NO MORE 1191 
Third, relying on Renton, the Supreme Court has declared on several 
occasions that the search for an illicit governmental motive is the “principal 
inquiry” in content-neutrality analysis.12  Lower courts have taken this 
claim quite seriously.  This often results in courts treating a law as neutral 
unless and until a litigant proves that the legislature acted with an improper 
motive—an exceedingly difficult standard for plaintiffs to satisfy. 
Together, these three developments in neutrality analysis have at times 
transformed the First Amendment from a meaningful command about the 
effects of a law—“make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”13—to 
a shallow and easily evaded inquiry into whether the government can name 
just one neutral purpose served by the law. 
We say “at times” because, while this transformation is real and, in our 
view, quite dangerous, it is not yet complete or universal.  There are still 
examples of cases, both at the Supreme Court and in the lower courts, that 
do not make this error.  This is welcome news for the health of the First 
Amendment, because it means there is still room for courts to correct the 
problem.  Doing so, however, requires understanding how the neutrality 
analysis was traditionally employed, how the secondary effects doctrine has 
gradually warped that analysis over time, and how existing precedents and 
current cases offer the Supreme Court a path back to the original test. 
Parts I and II of this Article set forth our doctrinal argument about the 
influence of the secondary effects doctrine.  Part I briefly describes the 
content-neutrality inquiry that lies at the heart of First Amendment analysis 
and how the Court has traditionally applied this standard to require 
neutrality in three respects:  the law’s application, the asserted government 
justification, and the governmental motive.  Part II explores how the three 
doctrinal changes set out above have quietly distorted the standard content-
neutrality doctrine over the past three decades, frequently turning it into a 
much weaker and less speech-protective inquiry than is generally 
understood. 
Part III looks at some post-Renton decisions both at the Supreme Court 
and in the federal courts of appeals to demonstrate how this doctrinal shift 
has caused precisely the changes to First Amendment law feared by 
Renton’s early critics, even where courts do not expressly embrace or apply 
the secondary effects doctrine.  Indeed, in several recent cases, different 
federal courts of appeals have relied on these doctrinal shifts to declare even 
openly viewpoint-discriminatory laws—laws the courts themselves 
recognized as designed to “singl[e] out . . . favored messages”14 in public 
forum speech regulation—to be “content neutral.” 
 
 12. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“The principal 
inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a 
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”); see also Hill v. 
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 711 (2000) (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 14. See, e.g., Int’l Women’s Day March Planning Comm. v. City of San Antonio, 619 
F.3d 346, 361 (5th Cir. 2010); see also infra Part III.B.4. 
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Finally, Part IV discusses some suggested ways in which both the 
Supreme Court and the lower courts can act to restore the content-neutrality 
test to its intended strength, and therefore to its role as “the keystone of 
First Amendment law.”15 
I.  THE TRADITIONAL CONTENT-NEUTRALITY ANALYSIS:  
THREE TYPES OF NONNEUTRALITY 
The content-neutrality inquiry has been deemed “[p]erhaps the most 
intriguing feature . . . [and] the most pervasively employed doctrine in the 
jurisprudence of free expression.”16  The Court has repeatedly indicated that 
the content inquiry is designed to prohibit government efforts to 
discriminate among ideas.17  Ultimately, the content inquiry helps identify 
those laws that are most likely to arise from discriminatory motives and are 
most susceptible to abuse.18  As Justice Elena Kagan has explained, the 
goal of the content distinction is “to identify a set of improper motives, 
which themselves may give rise to untoward consequences.”19 
The differences in treatment of content-based and content-neutral 
restrictions make the content distinction almost dispositive on the issue of a 
statute’s constitutionality.20  In order to protect against government 
discrimination among different messages,21 courts apply strict scrutiny to 
content-based laws,22 under which the legislature must be found to have 
 
 15. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose:  The Role of Governmental Motive in 
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 443 (1996). 
 16. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 189 (1983); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 110 (1980); 
Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
113, 113 (1981).  Professor Redish has argued that the distinction “is both theoretically 
questionable and difficult to apply,” and has suggested that we do away with it. Redish, 
supra, at 114. 
 17. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (“The rationale of the 
general prohibition, after all, is that content discrimination ‘raises the specter that the 
Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’” 
(quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 116 (1991))). 
 18. See Kagan, supra note 15, at 451–52. 
 19. Id. at 451. 
 20. See Stone, supra note 16, at 196 (noting that the scrutiny used for content-based 
regulations “approaches absolute protection”). 
 21. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (“[T]he First Amendment reflects 
a ‘profound national commitment’ to the principle that ‘debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,’ and [the Supreme Court] ha[s] consistently commented 
on the central importance of protecting speech on public issues.” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 
460 U.S. 37, 66 (1983) (“[V]iewpoint discrimination implicates core First Amendment 
values . . . .”). 
 22. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 660 (1994) (noting that, 
even absent evidence of illicit motive, strict scrutiny is also employed when the government 
regulates in a manner that “raise[s] suspicions that their objective [is], in fact, the 
suppression of certain ideas”); Perry, 460 U.S. at 66 (agreeing that “no case has applied any 
but the most exacting scrutiny to a content or speaker restriction that . . . tended to favor the 
advocacy of one point of view on a given issue” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1296 (7th Cir. 1981))). 
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crafted a narrowly tailored restriction that is necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest.23  Many commentators have noted—and the 
Court’s opinions demonstrate—that this test is nearly impossible to 
satisfy.24 
Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand, generally receive more 
deferential treatment.25  Not only is the government interest held to a lower 
standard—the interest need be merely “significant” or “substantial” rather 
than “compelling”26—but the Court has also explicitly rejected a strict 
“least restrictive means” test, requiring instead that the means be narrowly 
tailored and leave ample alternative outlets.27  In addition to receiving this 
more relaxed standard of review, content-neutral laws may be treated as 
“time, place, and manner” restrictions,28 and may even impose differential 
burdens on speakers so long as they are “incidental.”29 
 
 23. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 660–61.  There is also a strain within the First Amendment 
cases that suggests that a content-based law should be considered per se unconstitutional, at 
least in certain circumstances.  For example, the Court has declared, “The government must 
abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or 
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (emphasis added).  This language 
suggests that, in some circumstances, the targeting of particular content might not even be 
eligible for the compelling interest test.  This view of content-based laws was also endorsed 
by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime 
Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 124–25 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 24. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (noting that 
strict scrutiny “is a demanding standard.  ‘It is rare that a regulation restricting speech 
because of its content will ever be permissible.’” (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t 
Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000))); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) 
(noting that strict scrutiny is “the most demanding test known to constitutional law”). 
 25. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 312–13 (1984) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has dramatically lowered its scrutiny . . . once it has 
determined that such regulations are content-neutral[,] . . . [applying] only a minimal level of 
scrutiny.”); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. 
PA. L. REV. 615, 654 (1991) (noting that content neutral regulations receive more lenient 
treatment because they “do not pose the type of threat with which the Court is primarily 
concerned”). 
 26. See Williams, supra note 25, at 640 (“A significant state interest represents a type of 
lowest common denominator . . . .”); see also Redish, supra note 16, at 127 (“[I]t is 
practically inconceivable that an asserted governmental purpose will not qualify.”).  
Although the content-neutrality tests discussed herein have developed in varied 
circumstances, most notably in symbolic speech and time, place, and manner restrictions, 
these tests have essentially merged. See Williams, supra note 25, at 650–54 (noting that 
there is “little, if any” difference between the tests (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 298)). 
 27. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797 (1989); see also id. at 803 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s substitution of “mandatory deference” in 
place of the previous narrow-tailoring requirement). 
 28. See Redish, supra note 16, at 114–15 (citing regulations, such as the ordinance at 
issue in Mosley, which limited only the time, place, or manner of expression but did so based 
on content and thus did not receive deferential review).  “Time, place, and manner” 
restrictions are allowed because the Court has recognized that 
expressive activity, even in a quintessential public forum, may interfere with other 
important activities for which the property is used.  Accordingly, this Court has 
held that the government may regulate the time, place, and manner of the 
expressive activity, so long as such restrictions are content neutral, are narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample 
alternatives for communication. 
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In order to understand fully the ways in which the neutrality test has been 
warped, it is helpful to think of three aspects of content-neutrality, all of 
which were traditionally required before the Court would deem a law 
neutral.  First, to qualify as neutral, a law must be neutral in its application:  
the law must apply equally to speech regardless of its message.30  Second, 
the law must also be content neutral in its justification:  the government 
must prove that the interests asserted to support the law are implicated 
regardless of the content of speech.31  This justification analysis asks 
whether it is something about the content of the speech itself that raises the 
government’s interest or makes the government think the interest needs 
protecting in the particular context at issue.32  Third, the legislature must 
not have acted with the motive of favoring or disfavoring a particular 
viewpoint or content. 
A.  The Application Inquiry 
A court will deem a law content based, and therefore almost certainly 
invalid, if its application is determined by the content of expression.33  
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley34 provides a classic example.  The 
City of Chicago had enacted a municipal ordinance banning all picketing 
within 150 feet of a school building while school was in session, except 
“the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.”35  
 
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 29. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; see also Redish, supra note 16, at 126–27. 
 30. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) 
(“Section 505 applies only to channels primarily dedicated to ‘sexually explicit adult 
programming or other programming that is indecent.’”); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 
310, 315 (1990) (“The Government contends that the Flag Protection Act is constitutional 
because . . . the Act does not target expressive conduct on the basis of the content of its 
message.”); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 31. See, e.g., Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315 (“Although the Flag Protection Act contains no 
explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear 
that the Government’s asserted interest is related ‘to the suppression of free expression,’ and 
concerned with the content of such expression.” (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 
410 (1989))). 
 32. See id. at 315–17.  Flag-burning cases provide the clearest example of the Supreme 
Court using this type of analysis.  In both Texas v. Johnson and United States v. Eichman, 
the Court evaluated the constitutionality of laws against burning the American flag.  The 
government each time asserted interests in preserving the flag as a national symbol and 
preventing onlookers from being offended or starting a confrontation.  Because the Court 
ruled that these interests were dependent on the intended message of the flag burning—that 
these interests were only harmed by someone who burned the flag to criticize the United 
States but not by a Marine who performed the exact same burning but did so to dispose 
respectfully of the flag—the laws had content-based justifications.  Because the asserted 
interests were only threatened by burnings with a certain message, the Court applied strict 
scrutiny. See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 318. See generally Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412. 
 33. See, e.g., Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 93.  As will be discussed infra, the statute in Mosley technically does not state 
an application-based exception.  Rather, the statute simply identifies the location of the 
protested event—here a labor problem—and the Court treated the law as containing the 
additional requirement that the protesting outside the school involved in the labor dispute 
had to concern the labor dispute to qualify for the special treatment.  Because Mosley 
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Striking down the law, the Court noted that, because of the explicit 
exception for labor picketing, “the ordinance itself describes impermissible 
picketing not in terms of time, place, and manner, but in terms of subject 
matter.  The regulation ‘thus slip[s] from . . . neutrality . . . into a concern 
about content.’”36  Thus, because one must know the content of the speech 
in order to determine whether the speech violates the law—i.e., in order to 
apply the law—the ordinance is content based. 
The flag-burning case of Texas v. Johnson37 provides another example.  
There, the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas law prohibiting the 
“desecration of venerable objects” using a typical application-based 
analysis.  The Court struck down the law because it defined the crime as 
requiring that the actor know it “will seriously offend” others.38  The law 
thus sorted legal from illegal flag burning based on whether it was likely to 
offend others.  As the Court found, “Whether Johnson’s treatment of the 
flag violated Texas law thus depended on the likely communicative impact 
of his expressive conduct.”39  The Court found the law to be content based 
in its application and thus unconstitutional.40 
Thus far, the content inquiry is straightforward.  If a law applies only to 
speech of a particular content or viewpoint, it will be deemed content based 
and will likely be struck down.  This makes sense because any law that 
applies only to certain content is overwhelmingly likely to arise from an 
illegitimate governmental objective, whether it be aiding speakers with a 
favored viewpoint or burdening speakers with a disfavored one. 
As we shall see, though, few legislatures are foolish (or honest) enough 
to admit they are attempting to burden speech of a particular content.  
Rather, most legislatures can accomplish the same end by:  (a) broadening 
the restriction to apply, at least in theory, to a wider range of speech; or 
(b) by claiming that the true objective is to address some other problem not 
directly tied to speech.  Thus, the traditional content-neutrality test 
necessarily focused not only on the law’s application, but also on the law’s 
justification. 
B.  The Justification Inquiry 
The Court has repeatedly stated that in order to be considered content 
neutral, a law must be “justified without reference” to the content of speech. 
When properly employed, this “justified without reference” test requires 
(1) the government to offer a neutral interest supporting the law, and (2) the 
court to test that neutral interest to determine whether it is only threatened 
 
traditionally is treated as the quintessential example of discrimination in application based on 
content, we will treat it as such for the time being. But see infra notes 117–20 and 
accompanying text. 
 36. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99 (alteration in original) (quoting Henry Kalven, Jr., The 
Concept of Public Forum:  Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 29). 
 37. 491 U.S. at 397. 
 38. Id. at 400 n.1. 
 39. Id. at 411. 
 40. See id. at 420. 
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by speech of a particular content.  Thus, unlike the application inquiry—
which focuses on how the law actually applies—the justification inquiry 
focuses instead on the interests the law serves, and whether it serves those 
interests regardless of the content of the speech involved. 
Three cases in particular demonstrate how rigorous this justification 
inquiry can be:  United States v. O’Brien,41 Clark v. Community for 
Creative Non-Violence,42 and United States v. Eichman.43 
In symbolic speech cases beginning with O’Brien, the Court indicated 
that a law prohibiting expressive conduct is only “sufficiently justified . . . 
if it furthers . . . a substantial governmental interest [and] if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”44  
The statute at issue in O’Brien prohibited destruction of a draft card.45  The 
Court began by stating that the law was content neutral in its application; it 
did not distinguish among those who burned the draft card for different 
messages or between those who destroyed draft cards for no expressive 
purpose at all and those who did so for its communicative value.46 
But this finding of content-neutral application did not end the First 
Amendment inquiry.  Instead, the Court went on to examine the statute to 
determine whether it was content neutral in its justification as well.47  The 
Court began this analysis by focusing on the government interests 
supporting the law.  The Court found that Congress had a “legitimate and 
substantial” interest in preserving draft cards because the cards serve 
purposes such as proving that an individual has registered for the draft, 
facilitating communication between registrants and local boards, and 
demonstrating availability for induction in times of national crisis.48  These 
interests, at least in theory,49 were implicated by all destruction of draft 
cards, not merely destruction performed in order to express certain views.50  
Because the government interest was implicated by any destruction, 
 
 41. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 42. 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
 43. 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
 44. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
 45. See id. at 370. 
 46. See id. at 375 (“[The statute] prohibits the knowing destruction of certificates issued 
by the Selective Service System, and there is nothing necessarily expressive about such 
conduct.  The [statute] does not distinguish between public and private destruction, and it 
does not punish only destruction engaged in for the purpose of expressing views.”). 
 47. See id. at 377. 
 48. See id. at 378–79. 
 49. One might argue, however, that the law really was content based because hardly 
anyone ever burned draft cards except for precisely the purpose of communicating 
opposition to the draft.  In other words, it is very unlikely that the law was motivated by a 
wish to punish the “odd soul who burns a draft card just to stay warm or to light up his 
campsite.” Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive Public and Private:  Some Notes 
Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 34. 
 50. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382 (“When O’Brien deliberately rendered unavailable his 
registration certificate, he wilfully frustrated this governmental interest.  For th[e] 
noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for nothing else, he was convicted.  [This 
case] is therefore unlike one where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct 
arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself 
thought to be harmful.”). 
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regardless of the presence or content of expression, the Court found the 
government interest to be “unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression.”51  The law was justified without reference to the content of 
speech. 
The Court also has used a strong justification inquiry in cases involving 
time, place, and manner restrictions.  In Clark, for example, a group called 
Community for Creative Non-Violence sought to participate in a round-the-
clock demonstration on the National Mall and in Lafayette Park in 
Washington, D.C.52  Pursuant to an Interior Department regulation, the 
National Parks Service denied permission for the portion of the 
demonstration that called for sleeping overnight in the park.53  In analyzing 
the First Amendment challenge, the Court first reiterated the requirement 
that a law not only be content neutral in its application, but also must be 
“justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”54 
The Court found this justification inquiry satisfied because the 
government’s asserted interest was implicated by any overnight sleeping in 
the park, not just that with a certain message:  “Damage to the parks as well 
as their partial inaccessibility to other members of the public can as easily 
result from camping by demonstrators as by nondemonstrators.”55  Thus, as 
in O’Brien, the Supreme Court’s content inquiry asked not whether the state 
had merely asserted an interest that did not mention content, but whether 
that interest would be threatened by all the prohibited conduct regardless of 
its message, or only by conduct with a particular message.  As in O’Brien, 
the law at issue was justified without reference to the content of speech. 
The best example of the Court rejecting a statute through this 
justification-based content analysis occurs in the second of the flag-burning 
cases, Eichman.  In response to the Court’s decision in Johnson, Congress 
enacted its own flag-burning prohibition, this time eliminating the “offense” 
requirement, presumably in hopes of being deemed content neutral because 
of its new, broader application.56  The Court made clear, however, that a 
legislature cannot simply create content neutrality by enacting a broader law 
to serve the same content-driven interests.  When the new law was 
challenged, the Court held that although the law would indeed survive an 
application-based analysis, it remained content-based because it failed a 
justification-based inquiry:  “Although the Flag Protection Act contains no 
explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct,”—i.e., 
it was content neutral in application—“it is nevertheless clear that the 
Government’s asserted interest is ‘related to the suppression of free 
expression,’ . . . and concerned with the content of such expression.”57  In 
explaining this finding, the Court indicated that Congress’s asserted 
 
 51. Id. at 377. 
 52. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 291–92 (1984). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 293. 
 55. Id. at 298. 
 56. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 314 (1990). 
 57. Id. at 315 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989)). 
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interest—preserving the flag as a national symbol—was implicated only by 
certain acts of burning the flag, based on their communicative content.58  
Thus, because the government’s interest was threatened only by flag 
burning with a particular content, the law’s justification was content based, 
and the Court rejected the law as unconstitutional.59  Simply put, the law 
was not justified without reference to the content of speech. 
Together, O’Brien, Clark, and Eichman demonstrate that the test for 
content-neutrality treatment is not limited merely to a law’s application, but 
must also include an analysis of whether the government’s asserted 
justification depends on content.  The government’s asserted interest must 
be one that is implicated by the prohibited act without regard to 
communicative content. 
C.  The Motivation Inquiry 
Beyond looking at a law’s application and justification, the neutrality test 
has also historically considered the government’s purpose or motive, at 
least to some extent.  The Court’s approach in this area has always been 
somewhat confusing.  On one hand, the Court famously proclaimed in 
O’Brien that “this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional 
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”60  Yet the Court 
has also declared that “a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain 
circumstances to show that a regulation is content-based.”61 
Despite these tensions, it is clear that the Court has historically 
considered whether a law was enacted for the purpose of restricting speech 
with which the government disagrees as part of its neutrality test.  For 
example, in Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,62 the 
Court analyzed an ordinance that prohibited the posting of signs on public 
property.63  The Court explained that there could be some asserted 
government interests “such as a desire to suppress support for a minority 
party or an unpopular cause, or to exclude the expression of certain points 
of view from the marketplace of ideas,” that are “so plainly illegitimate that 
they would immediately invalidate the rule.”64  Yet the Court found the law 
neutral because it saw “not even a hint of bias or censorship in the City’s 
enactment or enforcement of this ordinance,” and there was “no claim that 
the ordinance was designed to suppress certain ideas that the City finds 
distasteful or that it has been applied to appellees because of the views that 
they express.”65 
 
 58. See id. at 316–17. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). 
 61. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). 
 62. 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
 63. Id. at 804. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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The Court recently confirmed that it will consider governmental purpose 
or motive in its content analysis in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.66  In Sorrell, 
the Court considered the constitutionality of a Vermont law regulating the 
use and dissemination of pharmacy records that reveal the prescribing 
practices of individual doctors.  The Court explained, “Just as the 
‘inevitable effect of a statute on its face may render it unconstitutional,’ a 
statute’s stated purposes may also be considered.”67  The Court found that 
the legislature had “designed [the statute] to target [certain] speakers and 
their messages for disfavored treatment,” and found the law content 
based.68 
To be sure, this is an inquiry that most laws survive—it is clear that only 
the rare legislature would be honest or ill-advised enough to expressly 
design a law for improper purposes.  Yet it is equally clear that, should such 
a motive be actually discovered, the Court will deem a law to be 
unconstitutional. 
Justice Kagan has suggested that the content-neutrality analysis itself 
appears to be designed to ferret out improper government motives.69  As 
she put it, the application of First Amendment law is best understood and 
explained “as a kind of motive-hunting,”70 with courts looking to invalidate 
laws based on an impermissible legislative motive, namely government 
disagreement with certain messages.71  Yet, because direct inquiries into 
motive would be easy for governments to avoid, Justice Kagan argues that 
the content-neutrality test functions as a “tool[] to flush out illicit motives 
and to invalidate actions infected with them.”72  In this way, the content-
neutrality inquiry “serves as the keystone to First Amendment law.”73 
We agree with Justice Kagan’s assessment of First Amendment doctrine 
in general, the neutrality test in particular, and the dangers of building the 
 
 66. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663–64 (2011). 
 67. Id. at 2663 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968)). 
 68. Id. at 2663–64 (“Given the legislature’s expressed statement of purpose, it is 
apparent that [the law] imposes burdens that are based on the content of speech and that are 
aimed at a particular viewpoint.”); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 
(1992) (“The point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in 
some fashion other than silencing speech.”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If 
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may 
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”). 
 69. See Kagan, supra note 15, at 414. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  Kagan further explains: 
  Let us accept that the First Amendment prohibits restrictions on speech 
stemming, even in part, from hostility, sympathy, or self-interest.  And let us 
accept that the difficulty of proving this impermissible motive—resulting, most 
notably, from the government’s ability to invoke pretextual reasons—gives rise to 
a set of rules able to flush out bad motives without directly asking about them.  
What would these rules look like? 
  The first rule would draw a sharp divide between content-based and content-
neutral restrictions. 
Id. at 443. 
 73. Id. 
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doctrine around direct inquiries that governments can easily manipulate to 
restrict speech.  As set forth in the next section, however, we believe that 
the neutrality test has become—in a way that could not have been apparent 
at the time of Justice Kagan’s article—a much more direct inquiry into 
motive, and thus precisely the sort of easily avoidable and manipulable test 
Justice Kagan criticized. 
II.  HOW THE SECONDARY EFFECTS DOCTRINE HAS WARPED THE 
NEUTRALITY INQUIRY 
When courts employ all three aspects of the traditional neutrality 
analysis—the application test, the “justified without reference” analysis, 
and a motivation inquiry—the content-neutrality test can act as a relatively 
effective mechanism for screening out improper speech restrictions.  As set 
forth in this section, however, the secondary effects doctrine undermines 
this traditional inquiry in three important ways. 
First, the express use of the secondary effects doctrine directly 
undermines the most straightforward requirement of content neutrality:  that 
a law must be neutral in its application.  As Renton’s critics have noted, the 
secondary effects doctrine itself permits governments to regulate speech 
based on its content—that is, to enact laws that are content based in their 
application—so long as it is asserting a neutral reason for the regulation. 
Second, because of reliance on Renton, courts (including the Supreme 
Court) have begun using a much weaker version of the “justified without 
reference” analysis, even in non-secondary-effects cases concerning core 
political speech.  In particular, the post-Renton approach to this justification 
analysis does not seem to require the same type of means-ends analysis 
undertaken in O’Brien, Clark, and Eichman. 
Third, again in reliance on Renton, courts have begun claiming that the 
“principal inquiry” for content analysis is whether the government operated 
with an impermissible motive (i.e., “because of disagreement with the 
message it conveys”).74  This formulation of the neutrality analysis 
improperly elevates motive—which is easy for governments to fake and 
hard for courts to assess—over the more objective application and 
justification inquiries. 
Our hypothesis here is that these three developments—and particularly 
the last two—have subtly distorted the content-neutrality analysis even 
applied to regulations of political speech by turning it into a direct inquiry 
focused almost exclusively on legislative motive.  As we see it, this 
weakens the neutrality inquiry and is a departure from the traditional 
content analysis in precisely the same way many commentators feared the 
secondary effects doctrine would eviscerate the First Amendment.  But 
because these changes have occurred gradually over time—and because the 
secondary effects doctrine is almost never mentioned in these cases—these 
developments have not prompted anything like the outcry from First 
Amendment scholars that originally greeted Renton. 
 
 74. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
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A.  Express Use of the Secondary Effects Doctrine Undermines the 
Content-Neutrality Test 
The development of the secondary effects doctrine undermines the 
neutrality test because it permits laws that are clearly content based to be 
treated as content neutral in certain circumstances. 
1.  Origins of the Doctrine:  Young, Renton, and City of Erie 
Historically, the secondary effects doctrine can be traced to Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc.,75 where the Court considered a city 
ordinance that regulated the placement of adult theaters in relation to other 
adult businesses and residential areas.76  Although acknowledging that the 
law was content based, the Court ultimately held that the law was justified 
by “the city’s interest in preserving the character of its neighborhoods.”77  
In a footnote, the Court used, for the first time, the “secondary effects” 
language: 
 The Common Council’s determination was that a concentration of 
“adult” movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate and become a focus 
of crime, effects which are not attributable to theaters showing other types 
of films.  It is this secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt 
to avoid, not the dissemination of “offensive” speech.78 
The Court explained that its footnoted reference to “secondary effects” was 
not its sole reason for upholding the law.  The ruling was also supported by 
what the Court saw as the lower value of “adult” speech as compared with 
“untrammeled political debate” or “political oratory or philosophical 
discussion.”79 
A decade later, the Court followed Young with its decision in Renton.80  
Renton involved a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult theaters from 
being located within a thousand feet of any residential zone, park, church, 
or school.81  The Court first observed that the ordinance did not “fit neatly 
into either the ‘content-based’ or the ‘content-neutral’ category,”82 as the 
ordinance was addressed specifically at adult theaters yet restricted only 
their location.  The Court deemed the ordinance content neutral, however, 
noting that the law “is aimed not at the content of the films shown at ‘adult 
motion picture theatres,’ but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters 
 
 75. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
 76. Id. at 52–53. 
 77. Id. at 71. 
 78. Id. at 71 n.34. 
 79. Id. at 70 (“[I]t is manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of expression 
is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political 
debate that inspired Voltaire’s immortal comment.  Whether political oratory or 
philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild 
can understand why our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same.  But few of us 
would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see 
‘Specified Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the theaters of our choice.”). 
 80. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 81. Id. at 43. 
 82. Id. at 47. 
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on the surrounding community.”83  The Court therefore believed that the 
City’s “predominant” intent was “unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression.”84  The city had acted validly in attempting to “prevent crime, 
protect the city’s retail trade, [and] maintain property values, . . . not to 
suppress the expression of unpopular views.”85 
The Renton Court made certain, however, to also cite Young’s statement 
distinguishing the level of First Amendment protection for such speech as 
compared to political speech:  “[I]t is manifest that society’s interest in 
protecting [sexually explicit] expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, 
magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate . . . .”86  And in 
dissent, Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall attempted to 
reinforce this point by arguing that “the Court’s analysis is limited to cases 
involving ‘businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials,’ and thus does 
not affect our holdings in cases involving state regulation of other kinds of 
speech.”87 
The Court applied the secondary effects doctrine again in City of Erie v. 
Pap’s A.M.88  In Erie, the Court relied on the secondary effects doctrine to 
hold that a ban on public nudity was content neutral.  Although there was 
some evidence that the law was aimed at banning nude dancing—including 
“statements by the city attorney that the public nudity ban was not intended 
to apply to ‘legitimate’ theater productions”—the Court found the law 
neutral because “one purpose” of the ordinance was “to combat harmful 
secondary effects.”89 
Together, Young, Renton, and Erie establish that—at least in the context 
of pornography and adult businesses—a law that would otherwise fail the 
traditional content-neutrality analysis may still be analyzed as content 
neutral.  This is apparently true even:  (1) when the law’s application turns 
entirely on the content of speech (for example, the zoning restrictions in 
Renton were triggered solely by the content of movies shown); (2) when the 
law’s justification depends on content (for example, the zoning restrictions 
in Renton were justified only because of a perceived connection between 
the content of films shown and likely crime and other effects in the 
community); and (3) even where there is evidence of a content-based 
motivation (for example, in Erie, where the Court was willing to ignore 
openly stated government content preferences so long as “one purpose” of 
the law was to target secondary effects).  In this regard, the secondary 
effects test therefore undermines each of the three parts of the traditional 
neutrality inquiry described in Part I.B, supra. 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 48. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 49 n.2 (first alteration in original) (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 
427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)). 
 87. Id. at 55–56 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 88. 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
 89. Id. at 292. 
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2.  Secondary Effects and Government Motive 
At heart, secondary effects doctrine is really a claim about the importance 
of governmental motive.  The doctrine essentially provides that a 
government regulation of speech can be permissible if the government’s 
motive—that is, its reason for enacting a particular law—is something other 
than a concern about the communicative impact of the speech.  If the laws 
in either Renton or Young were enacted simply because the legislatures 
disliked the content of the films at issue, both would have been 
unconstitutionally content based.  But because the legislature asserted a 
different motive—namely to address the “secondary” effects of adult movie 
theaters, such as the crime that often accompanies such theaters—the laws 
were not subjected to strict scrutiny and were upheld. 
The ease with which the secondary effects doctrine permits a 
governmental claim of permissible motive to insulate a law from strict 
scrutiny prompted many commentators to sound the First Amendment 
alarm.  As discussed above, Justice Brennan explained the dangers of 
permitting a government’s claimed motive to govern the level of scrutiny a 
speech restriction receives: 
 The dangers and difficulties posed by the Renton analysis are 
extensive.  Although in this case it is easy enough to determine that the 
display clause does not aim at a “secondary effect” of speech, future 
litigants are unlikely to be so bold or so forthright as to defend a 
restriction on speech with the argument that the restriction aims to protect 
listeners from the indignity of hearing speech that criticizes them.  Rather, 
they are likely to defend content-based restrictions by pointing, as Justice 
O’Connor suggests, to secondary effects like “congestion, . . . visual 
clutter, or . . . security . . .”  But such secondary effects offer countless 
excuses for content-based suppression of political speech.90 
Many commentators have raised similar concerns, calling the secondary 
effects doctrine “an impressively bold act of illogic”91 that has “been much 
discredited,”92 and “if taken seriously and applied broadly, would 
effectively negate all First Amendment protection for all disfavored 
advocacy.”93  As David Hudson observes, “The problem with this 
 
 90. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted). 
 91. Amy Adler, Girls!  Girls!  Girls!:  The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108, 1120 (2005) (“It would seem hard to imagine a law that was more 
obviously a regulation of speech based on its content.  Yet the Court, in an impressively bold 
act of illogic, deemed the ordinance content-neutral. . . .  Thus the justification for the law, 
not the face of the law, became dispositive of its First Amendment validity.”). 
 92. Stephen Townley, Note, The Hydraulics of Fighting Terrorism, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 
65, 79 n.93 (2006) (“The secondary effects doctrine has, however, been much discredited.”). 
 93. Thomas R. McCoy, Understanding McConnell v. FEC and Its Implications for the 
Constitutional Protection of Corporate Speech, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1043, 1048 n.31 (2005) 
(“It is difficult to perceive any limit on the applicability of this secondary effects doctrine 
since the government’s ultimate regulatory objective in every case of suppressing core 
political speech is the prevention of some undesirable effect of the message.  Direct 
suppression of the speech in and of itself is never the ultimate regulatory objective.  The 
ultimate regulatory objective is always the prevention of some effect that is expected to 
1204 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
expansive doctrine is that all speech causes effects.  The secondary effects 
doctrine, a fertile ground for abuse, insidiously eviscerates free expression 
by allowing government officials to characterize content-based regulations 
as content-neutral.  In practice, government officials use the doctrine to 
silence expression they dislike.”94 
3.  Secondary Effects Beyond Adult Businesses 
Despite these strong criticisms of the secondary effects doctrine, many 
commentators appear to take solace in the belief that the doctrine is 
generally confined to the context of adult businesses and pornography.  For 
example, John Fee explains in his recent article about the doctrine: 
 The good news . . . is that courts generally do not apply the secondary 
effects doctrine to most forms of protected speech.  The doctrine was 
created for the regulation of pornography and sexually oriented 
 
result from the message if left unrestricted.  Thus, it appears that the secondary effects 
doctrine, if taken seriously and applied broadly, would effectively negate all First 
Amendment protection for all disfavored advocacy.”); see also Heidi Kitrosser, From 
Marshall McLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows:  Communicative Manner and the First 
Amendment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1339, 1397–98 (2002) (“The secondary effects doctrine, or 
any deviation from treatment of facially content-based restrictions as content-based, is 
problematic insofar as it fails to comport with free speech theory and insofar as it accords 
unrealistic significance to government statements that a regulation has a neutral purpose.  As 
suggested above, those regulations that target content directly, either on their faces or in 
terms of their underlying governmental purposes, should raise presumptions of illegitimacy, 
justifying the application of strict scrutiny.  From this perspective, there is little basis to 
distinguish those regulations that target content directly and that the government justifies on 
a noncontent basis, from those regulations that target content directly, but that are 
unaccompanied by non-content-based justifications.”); Robert Post, Recuperating First 
Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1267 (1995) (“[T]he Court has so far failed to 
articulate any substantive First Amendment theory to guide its distinction between primary 
and secondary effects.”). 
 94. David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine:  “The Evisceration of First 
Amendment Freedoms,” 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55, 61 (1997); see also Neuman, supra note 4, at 
293 n.145 (“[I]f taken seriously as a statement of first amendment law, [Renton] would 
effectively eviscerate the concepts of ‘time, place and manner,’ ‘content neutrality,’ and 
‘narrow tailoring.’  It is reasonable to hope that the distortions introduced in that opinion will 
apply only to the category of ‘sexually explicit materials . . . .’”); Oser, supra note 4, at 350–
51 (“The shift to motivation and the reduced access requirement have alarmed commentators 
who fear that Renton marks a gutting of the first amendment.  They read Renton to say that 
any ordinance aimed at secondary effects, and not at the suppression of ideas, is 
constitutional if it meets a deferential balancing test.”); Philip J. Prygoski, The Supreme 
Court’s “Secondary Effects” Analysis in Free Speech Cases, 6 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 29 
(1989) (“The secondary effects analysis creates a grave danger of courts upholding laws that 
purport to regulate non-speech evils, but are actually designed to restrict the underlying 
speech activity.”); William M. Sunkel, City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.:  Court-
Approved Censorship Through Zoning, 7 PACE L. REV. 251, 253 (1986) (“The danger of the 
Renton decision is that it heralds a movement away from imposing any meaningful standard 
of judicial scrutiny on legislation which intrudes on fundamental first amendment freedoms.  
Instead, the Court seems to be headed towards a deferential, ‘rubber stamp’ approach to this 
kind of legislation.  In Renton, the Court effectively abandoned previously-delineated tests 
for determining the validity of a constitutionally-challenged ordinance.  Such an approach 
constitutes little more than tacit Court approval of governmental censorship through 
manipulation of a municipality’s zoning power.”). 
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entertainment, a type of expression that differs from other speech in 
significant ways. 
 . . . . 
 Indeed, recognizing the distinctive constitutional status of 
pornographic speech has the advantage of preventing the secondary 
effects doctrine from spilling into other areas of law, which could erode 
First Amendment protections for all forms of speech.95 
Other commentators are in agreement.96 
These commentators are generally correct, though the exceptions are 
important and worthy of discussion.  To be sure, in the years since Renton, 
no majority of the Court has ever explicitly applied the secondary effects 
approach to political speech.  In two cases, however, the Court appeared to 
at least consider using the doctrine outside the pornography context.  In 
Boos v. Barry,97 the Court considered a District of Columbia law that 
prohibited displaying signs within 500 feet of foreign embassies with a 
particular content—namely those that tended to bring the foreign 
government into “public odium” or “public disrepute.”98  Although the 
speech at issue was obviously core political speech, three justices (Sandra 
Day O’Connor, John Paul Stevens, and Antonin Scalia) at least considered 
applying Renton’s secondary effects doctrine.  They found Renton 
inapplicable not because the speech was higher value nonpornography 
speech, but because the law targeted the primary effect of speech—that is, 
the impact of the speech on its audience—and therefore fell outside of 
Renton. 
Similarly, a majority of the Court at least entertained the notion of using 
secondary effects analysis in the 1993 case of City of Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network, Inc.99  The case concerned a Cincinnati law regulating 
the placement of freestanding news racks on public property.100  The Court 
rejected the City’s attempt to rely on Renton, explaining that there was no 
evidence that news racks dispensing commercial handbills (which were 
banned) created different secondary effects than news racks dispensing 
newspapers (which were permitted).101  Thus, as in Boos, the Court again 
distinguished secondary effects analysis. 
Despite the absence of a Supreme Court decision expressly applying the 
secondary effects doctrine to nonpornographic speech, some lower courts 
have begun using the doctrine more broadly, as a handful of commentators 
 
 95. Fee, supra note 7, at 293–94. 
 96. For example, Kathleen Sullivan likewise explained that the secondary effects 
doctrine is used by the Court to “uphold otherwise content-based statutes [concerning 
sexually explicit speech] whose political counterparts would readily be struck down.” 
Sullivan, supra note 6, at 730. 
 97. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
 98. Id. at 315. 
 99. 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
 100. Id. at 412. 
 101. Id. at 430. 
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have pointed out.102  These areas include door-to-door solicitation,103 
billboards,104 discrimination,105 and commercial entertainment.106  As these 
cases indicate, although the Supreme Court has only applied the secondary 
effects doctrine to adult business and pornography cases, lower courts have, 
at least on occasion, used the doctrine more broadly. 
We suspect that it is the general infrequency of these express uses of the 
secondary effects doctrine that has prompted many commentators to believe 
Renton has been cabined to sexually explicit speech and did not cause the 
severe damage its early critics feared.  Nevertheless, we believe that Renton 
is actually causing this damage quietly through the subtle changes to the 
neutrality inquiry described below. 
B.  A Changed “Justified Without Reference” Analysis 
As described above in Part I.B, the traditional content-neutrality analysis 
includes an inquiry into whether a law is “justified without reference to the 
content of speech.”  Historically, that inquiry required the government to do 
something more than merely identify a government interest that was not 
related to content, such as “public safety,” or “keeping the parks clean,” or 
“improving traffic flow.”  Instead, the government was required to 
demonstrate that the relationship between its allegedly neutral interest and 
the regulation of speech it adopted did not depend on the content of speech.  
The Court used this justification analysis in O’Brien, Clark, and Eichman, 
forcing the government to convince the Court that its justification was 
sound, regardless of the expressive content of the regulated speech.  Thus, 
in Eichman, the Court rejected the state’s attempted reliance on an interest 
in protecting the flag as a national symbol not because it found the interest 
invalid (the Court said the opposite), but because the justification for the 
law only made sense as to flag burnings with a particular message.  The law 
was not justified without reference to the content of speech.107 
The secondary effects doctrine has worked a subtle and perhaps 
unintended change to the traditional “justified without reference” test.108  
 
 102. See generally David L. Hudson, Jr., Justice Stevens, Justice Souter and the 
Secondary Effects Doctrine, 35 UWLA L. REV. 48, 59 (2003); Barry P. McDonald, Speech 
and Distrust:  Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1372–82 (2006); Christopher J. Andrew, Note, The Secondary 
Effects Doctrine:  The Historical Development, Current Application, and Potential 
Mischaracterization of an Elusive Judicial Precedent, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1213–
14 (2002). 
 103. See, e.g., City of Watseka v. Ill. Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1554–58 (7th 
Cir. 1986). 
 104. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Comm’r of Highways, 822 F.2d 586, 594–95 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 105. See, e.g., Presbytery of N.J. of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 902 F. 
Supp. 492, 521–22 (D.N.J. 1995). 
 106. See, e.g., Nat’l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 741–42, 749 
(1st Cir. 1995). 
 107. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
 108. For interesting discussions of “stealth overruling” (i.e., deliberate overruling of a 
prior precedent by the Court without expressly saying so) and “accidental overruling” (i.e., 
overruling past precedents truly by accident), see Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth 
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Rather than forcing the government to demonstrate that its regulation of 
speech served neutral interests regardless of the content of speech, the test 
has begun to resemble very closely the secondary effects analysis of 
Renton.  Instead of looking to see whether an allegedly neutral justification 
for a law is implicated regardless of content (as it would be, for example, by 
a requirement for a parade permit before marching down Main Street), 
courts have begun to simply ask whether the government was pursuing any 
neutral interest at all, without inquiring as to whether that neutral interest is 
served only by restricting speech of a particular content. 
1.  Justification Analysis in Renton Itself 
We believe this has occurred through a little-noticed aspect of Renton.  
Although the Court in Renton was quite clear that it was going to treat that 
expressly content-based law as content neutral because of the legislative 
motive of targeting secondary effects—the move that attracted all of the 
attention and criticism—the Court also asserted that the law in Renton was 
“justified without reference” to the content of regulated speech: 
 In short, the Renton ordinance is completely consistent with our 
definition of “content-neutral” speech regulations as those that “are 
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”  The 
ordinance does not contravene the fundamental principle that underlies 
our concern about “content-based” speech regulations:  that “government 
may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds 
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more 
controversial views.”109 
The cases cited by the Renton Court are consistent with the traditional form 
of the “justified without reference” test, which requires the government to 
put forward a justification that does not depend on the content of regulated 
speech (as described above in Part I.B).  Viewed in conjunction with these 
cases, there can be no serious contention that the Renton ordinance passed 
the test in the same way. 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., for example, was a commercial speech case that simply 
recited the test, but noted that there was no serious contention that a 
regulation prohibiting price advertising was content neutral.110  As 
described above, Clark expressly considered whether the connection 
between the banned activity (sleeping in parks) and the harm to be avoided 
 
Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010), and 
Suzanna Sherry, The Four Pillars of Constitutional Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 969 
(2011). 
 109. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48–49 (1986) (quoting Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976), 
and Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972)) (citing Clark v. Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984), and Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981)). 
 110. Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771 (“There is no claim, for example, that the prohibition 
on prescription drug price advertising is a mere time, place, and manner restriction.”). 
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(litter, etc.) was dependent on the communicative nature of the sleeping.  
Finding that the government’s interest was implicated as much by 
communicative as noncommunicative sleeping, the Court deemed the 
interest neutral.111 
In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, the Court 
implicitly found that the restriction on leafleting at the Minnesota State Fair 
was justified without reference to the content of speech.112  The plaintiffs in 
the Heffron case sought the right to practice Sankirtan, the practice of 
walking around, soliciting donations, and offering literature to passersby.113  
Although the Court indicated that such behavior in the public forum would 
likely receive different treatment, it noted that the asserted state interest in 
maintaining crowd flow in the limited public forum of a state fair was 
sufficient to justify the law.114  Notably, the Court explained that the state’s 
interest would be implicated as much by speakers with other content, 
including “other religious, nonreligious, and noncommercial organizations” 
as by the plaintiffs.115  Accordingly, the restriction in Heffron was clearly 
justified without reference to the content of speech.116 
Finally, the Renton Court’s reliance on Mosley further confirms that the 
“justified without reference test” was not historically satisfied by mere 
assertion of a neutral interest.  In Mosley, the government had prohibited 
picketing on a “public way” within 150 feet of a school, but had exempted 
peaceful labor picketing.117  In an effort to defend the law, the government 
 
 111. Clark, 468 U.S. at 299 (“[T]here is a substantial Government interest in conserving 
park property, an interest that is plainly served by, and requires for its implementation, 
measures such as the proscription of sleeping that are designed to limit the wear and tear on 
park properties.  That interest is unrelated to suppression of expression.”). 
 112. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 649 (“[The Minnesota law] applies evenhandedly to all who 
wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit funds.  No person or organization, 
whether commercial or charitable, is permitted to engage in such activities except from a 
booth rented for those purposes.”). 
 113. Id. at 644–46. 
 114. Id. at 654 (“By focusing on the incidental effect of providing an exemption from 
Rule 6.05 to [Heffron], the Minnesota Supreme Court did not take into account the fact that 
any such exemption cannot be meaningfully limited to [Heffron], and as applied to similarly 
situated groups would prevent the State from furthering its important concern with managing 
the flow of the crowd.  In our view, the Society may apply its Rule and confine the type of 
transactions at issue to designated locations without violating the First Amendment.”). 
 115. Id. at 653 (“Indeed, the court below agreed that without Rule 6.05 there would be 
widespread disorder at the fairgrounds.  The court also recognized . . . a much larger threat to 
the State’s interest in crowd control if all other religious, nonreligious, and noncommercial 
organizations could likewise move freely about the fairgrounds distributing and selling 
literature and soliciting funds at will.”). 
 116. Id. at 654. 
 117. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92–93 (1972).  Section 193-1 of the 
Chicago Municipal Code read: 
  A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly:  (i) Pickets or 
demonstrates on a public way within 150 feet of any primary or secondary school 
building while the school is in session and one-half hour before the school is in 
session and one-half hour after the school session has been concluded, provided 
that this subsection does not prohibit the peaceful picketing of any school involved 
in a labor dispute . . . . 
CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 193-1(i) (1972). 
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had argued that its exception was permissible “because, as a class, non-
labor picketing is more prone to produce violence than labor picketing.”118  
The Court rejected this asserted justification, noting that the First 
Amendment bars the city from making generalizations based on the content 
or subject matter of speech:  “Predictions about imminent disruption from 
picketing involve judgments appropriately made on an individualized basis, 
not by means of broad classifications, especially those based on subject 
matter.”119  Thus the city’s proffered justification was expressly, and 
impermissibly, based on the content of regulated speech.  Accordingly, the 
Court noted, “Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based 
on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone.”120 
Juxtaposed with these cases, it is clear that the ordinance in Renton could 
not actually pass the “justified without reference” test, at least as that test 
had been applied in the earlier cases described above.  Indeed, the exact 
opposite is true:  the only reason it made sense for the government in 
Renton to focus its regulation on adult establishments was the government’s 
belief that movie theaters with a particular content created negative 
secondary effects.121  Thus the city’s justification—that adult businesses 
cause certain harmful secondary effects—was actually directly based on 
content.122  If those businesses changed their content—if they started 
offering knitting clubs and church services instead of nude dancing—then 
the City’s secondary effects rationale disappears entirely. 
In this regard, Renton should have been the very exemplar of a law that 
was not justified without reference to content of speech.  The Renton Court 
should have simply acknowledged that the secondary effects doctrine was 
an exception to this part of the neutrality test as well, to avoid watering 
down the test when applied to the rest of free speech doctrine. 
Looking back, it is clear that the exact opposite has happened.  Rather 
than recognizing Renton as an exception to an ordinarily strong “justified 
without reference” analysis, the Court instead began treating Renton as a 
paradigmatic example of how the justification test should be employed. 
 
 118. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100. 
 119. Id. at 100–01. 
 120. Id. at 96 (emphasis added). 
 121. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) (“[T]he adult 
theater zoning ordinance was aimed at preventing the secondary effects caused by the 
presence of even one such theater in a given neighborhood.”); see also Northend Cinema, 
Inc. v. City of Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Wash. 1978) (explaining that the city amended 
the zoning code “to preserve the character and quality of residential life in its 
neighborhoods” and “to protect neighborhood children from increased safety hazards, and 
offensive and dehumanizing influence created by location of adult movie theaters in 
residential areas”). 
 122. See, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at 50; Northend Cinema, 585 P.2d at 1158 
(acknowledging “the different treatment accorded adult movie theaters as distinguished from 
other types of movie theaters”). 
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2.  Renton Becomes the New Exemplar of the Justification Inquiry 
Rather than treat the justification analysis in Renton as an outlier, the 
Court instead embraced it as the exemplar for this aspect of the neutrality 
test.  The first time this occurred, in Boos v. Barry,123 the Court cited 
Renton as providing “the definition of a content-neutral statute” as one that 
is “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”124 
Four years later in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,125 the Court again relied on 
Renton’s definition of neutrality for the “justified without reference” 
analysis: 
 Another valid basis for according differential treatment to even a 
content-defined subclass of proscribable speech is that the subclass 
happens to be associated with particular “secondary effects” of the 
speech, so that the regulation is “justified without reference to the content 
of the . . . speech.”126 
With this language, the Court in R.A.V. expressly tied Renton’s “justified 
without reference” analysis to its secondary effects language.  The R.A.V. 
Court apparently viewed Renton’s secondary effects arguments as 
connected to, and sufficient to satisfy, the “justified without reference” 
portion of the content-neutrality test.  In this manner, the secondary effects 
doctrine—so loudly objected to by so many defenders of the First 
Amendment—was essentially read into the standard justification inquiry, 
which is part of the standard neutrality analysis. 
Following the Supreme Court’s lead, many other courts have cited 
Renton for its “justified without reference” test.127  This broader use of 
Renton not only as an exemplar of the secondary effects doctrine, but also 
as a model for how to perform the “justified without reference” analysis, is 
particularly troubling.  The justification for the law in Renton expressly 
 
 123. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
 124. Id. at 320 (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 48) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 125. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 126. Id. at 389 (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 48). 
 127. A Westlaw search returns more than 100 hits. Search Results, WESTLAW.COM, 
http://www.westlaw.com (search “Renton /25 ‘justified without reference’” in the 
ALLCASES database) (last accessed Nov. 22, 2013).  Many of these cases appear to follow 
R.A.V.’s lead in treating Renton’s secondary effects analysis as part and parcel of its 
“justified without reference” analysis. See, e.g., McDoogal’s E., Inc. v. Cnty. Comm’rs, 341 
F. App’x 918, 924 (4th Cir. 2009) (“By focusing on the harmful secondary effects, the 
Enactments are ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” (quoting 
Renton, 475 U.S. at 48)); Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 67 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court has held that the speech restriction is content-neutral so long as it is ‘justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48)); 
Buzdum v. Vill. of Germantown, No. 06-C-159, 2007 WL 3012971, at *20 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 
12, 2007) (“Content-based time, place or manner regulations are subject only to intermediate 
scrutiny if they ‘are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” 
(quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 48)); Stadium Book & Video, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, Nos. 
04-20537-CIV-JORDAN, 04-21156-CIV-JORDAN, 04-20553-CIV-JORDAN, 2006 WL 
2374740, at *12 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2006) (“A regulation is subject to intermediate scrutiny if 
it is ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’ that is, if it is 
‘designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of such businesses.’” (quoting Renton, 
475 U.S. at 48)). 
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depended on content—it was the adult-oriented content of the businesses in 
Renton that convinced the city that they would cause negative secondary 
effects.  Thus, any “justified without reference” analysis that the Renton law 
would pass must be very watered down.  This analysis must essentially ask 
nothing more than what the secondary effects test asks:  is the government 
targeting speech because of disagreement with its message?  If not, this 
extremely weakened justification test is satisfied. 
 In a sense, this is precisely the effect Justice Brennan feared with the 
secondary effects doctrine itself, when he observed in Boos: 
 No doubt a plausible argument could be made that the political 
gatherings of some parties are more likely than others to attract large 
crowds causing congestion, that picketing for certain causes is more likely 
than other picketing to cause visual clutter, or that speakers delivering a 
particular message are more likely than others to attract an unruly 
audience.  Our traditional analysis rejects such a priori categorical 
judgments based on the content of speech, [Mosley], requiring 
governments to regulate based on actual congestion, visual clutter, or 
violence rather than based on predictions that speech with a certain 
content will induce those effects.  The Renton analysis, however, creates a 
possible avenue for governmental censorship whenever censors can 
concoct “secondary” rationalizations for regulating the content of political 
speech.128 
The same can be said for the post-Renton justification test:  if all the 
government needs is to name some reason other than disagreement with 
speech as its justification, surely such reasons will abound. 
Thus while it is certainly true that the Supreme Court has never expressly 
applied the secondary effects doctrine to sanction restriction of political 
speech, it is equally true that the Supreme Court has, through use of Renton, 
essentially enshrined the secondary effects analysis into a weakened version 
of the “justified without reference” test.  This weakened justification 
inquiry essentially requires courts only to look at whether the government 
has asserted a neutral motive for its actions, without inquiring whether the 
proffered justification depends on content. 
C.  Ward’s “Principal Inquiry” Analysis 
A third change in the content-neutrality test stems from the Supreme 
Court’s 1989 decision in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.129  As with both the 
secondary effects analysis and the Renton-inspired weaker “justified 
without reference” analysis, Ward’s change to the neutrality test focuses on 
governmental motive, and does so in heavy reliance on Renton. 
In Ward, the Court considered the constitutionality of a New York City 
law that regulated sound amplification at a Central Park bandshell.130  In 
 
 128. Boos, 485 U.S. at 335 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 129. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 130. Id. at 784. 
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setting forth the test for content neutrality, the Court explained that the 
“principal inquiry” of the neutrality test relates to the government’s motive: 
The principal inquiry in determining content-neutrality, in speech cases 
generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the 
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement 
with the message it conveys.  The government’s purpose is the controlling 
consideration.  A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content 
of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on 
some speakers or messages but not others.  Government regulation of 
expressive activity is content-neutral so long as it is “justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech.”131 
Ward’s “principal inquiry” paragraph makes three subtle but very 
important changes to the content-neutrality inquiry.  First, Ward’s emphasis 
on governmental purpose as “the controlling consideration” and the 
“principal inquiry” in the content-neutrality test was actually a new 
development in the doctrine.  In a sense, this language seems to confuse 
ends with means.  There has long been agreement that government 
discrimination among ideas is the main target of the content-neutrality test.  
But until Ward, the Court had never described an inquiry into government 
motive as the principal inquiry when doing the analysis.132 
The only authority the Court cites for its “principal inquiry” sentence is 
Clark.  Yet Clark actually did not elevate government purpose above other 
aspects of the neutrality test at all.  Instead, the cited portion of Clark 
simply stated, “The requirement that the regulation be content-neutral is 
clearly satisfied.  The courts below accepted that view, and it is not disputed 
here that the prohibition on camping, and on sleeping specifically, is 
content-neutral and is not being applied because of disagreement with the 
message presented.”133  Notably, although the passage from Clark clearly 
refers to the fact that the law is not being applied “because of disagreement 
with the message,” nothing in Clark suggests that this issue is the 
“principal” inquiry, or is more important than determining whether the law 
is neutral in its application or in its justification. 
Second, the elevation of governmental purpose in Ward’s formulation of 
the neutrality test may be due, at least in part, to Renton.  After citing Clark, 
the Ward Court explained that “a regulation that serves purposes unrelated 
to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental 
effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”134  Notably, the court 
cites Renton for this proposition.135 
 
 131. Id. at 791–92 (emphasis added) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)) (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at 295, Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48, 
Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981) (quoting Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)), 
and Boos, 485 U.S. at 320–21). 
 132. See generally Kagan, supra note 15. 
 133. Clark, 468 U.S. at 295. 
 134. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
 135. Id. (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48). 
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As with the justification inquiry, this reliance on Renton in a general 
statement of the content-neutrality test is another avenue through which the 
secondary effects approach may be having a broader impact than is 
generally understood.136  In fact, the reference to a law that “serves 
purposes unrelated to the content of expression” is essentially the secondary 
effects doctrine by another name.  A law banning all antiwar protests on the 
National Mall, for example, may be motivated by a dislike of antiwar 
protests, but it would certainly “serve purposes unrelated to the content of 
expression,” such as reducing litter and congestion.137  So too would a ban 
on flag burning (which produces smoke and risk of fire);138 a ban on 
leafleting about elections (which can lead to litter);139 and a ban on 
nonlabor protesting within 150 feet of a school (which could distract the 
students).140 
In short, it is virtually impossible to think of speech regulations—even 
flagrantly content-based speech regulations—that do not “serve purposes 
unrelated to the content of expression.”  If all of these qualify as “content-
neutral” simply because they also serve a purpose unrelated to content, then 
the neutrality test has no meaning at all. 
Third, Ward’s reference to “incidental” effects is particularly strange.  
Ward notes that a law may be content neutral despite the fact that it has “an 
incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”141  This is 
surely true as to some perfectly neutral laws.  For example, a law requiring 
a permit to march down Main Street has an incidental effect on speakers 
who want to march down Main Street,142 but not on speakers who get their 
 
 136. One notable exception here is Barry McDonald, who correctly recognized that 
Ward’s emphasis on purpose was a way of “importing” Renton that “threw the door wide 
open to content-neutral defenses for selective content restrictions.” See McDonald, supra 
note 102, at 1376. 
 137. See generally Clark, 468 U.S. at 288. 
 138. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding that flag burning was 
“expressive conduct” protected under the First Amendment and that “[t]he State’s interest in 
preventing breaches of the peace does not support his conviction because Johnson’s conduct 
did not threaten to disturb the peace”); id. at 410 (“We are equally persuaded that this 
interest is related to expression in the case of Johnson’s burning of the flag.  The State, 
apparently, is concerned that such conduct will lead people to believe either that the flag 
does not stand for nationhood and national unity, but instead reflects other, less positive 
concepts, or that the concepts reflected in the flag do not in fact exist, that is, that we do not 
enjoy unity as a Nation.  These concerns blossom only when a person’s treatment of the flag 
communicates some message, and thus are related ‘to the suppression of free expression’ 
within the meaning of O’Brien.”). 
 139. See, e.g., Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 649–50 
(1981). 
 140. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92–93, 102 (1972). 
 141. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1986)). 
 142. Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (“[T]he Court has 
recognized that government, in order to regulate competing uses of public forums, may 
impose a permit requirement on those wishing to hold a march, parade, or rally . . . .” (citing 
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574–76 (1941))); see, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of 
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 149 (1969) (“It shall be unlawful to organize or hold, or to assist 
in organizing or holding, or to take part or participate in, any parade or procession or other 
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message out by publishing books or buying television ads.  In such 
circumstances, the unequal impact of a permitting requirement probably 
would be “incidental,” that is, not the intended result of the law. 
Curiously, the Ward Court does not cite any such neutral law for this 
proposition—instead, it cites Renton.  In Renton, however, the relocation of 
adult businesses surely was not incidental to the regulatory scheme at 
issue.143  Rather, the relocation of businesses of that content was the 
deliberate mechanism through which the scheme attempted to achieve its 
stated purpose.  If businesses with adult content did not relocate, the law 
would have been a complete failure.  Thus, to the extent Renton qualifies as 
an “incidental” burden on the deliberately targeted speakers, the Court is 
actually redefining “incidental” to include situations where the government 
deliberately targets and directly regulates speakers according to the content 
of their speech, but purports to do it for a reason other than suppression of 
their ideas.  In other words, this use of Renton appears to read the secondary 
effects doctrine into the analysis of whether a burden is “incidentally” 
falling on a particular speaker or speakers based on content. 
Together, Ward’s elevation of governmental purpose as “the controlling 
consideration,” its characterization of the neutrality inquiry as satisfied so 
long as the law serves any “purposes unrelated to the content of speech,” 
and its characterization as “incidental” of even deliberate regulations of 
certain speech because of its content, suggest a further move toward making 
the neutrality test focus on motive. 
In this regard, Ward’s principal inquiry paragraph is the culmination of 
the Renton-driven doctrinal shifts we have described in this section.  The 
“principal inquiry” paragraph relies directly on Renton144—the principal 
secondary effects case—in a time, place, and manner case.  It cites Renton 
more broadly for the proposition that so long as a law serves any neutral 
purpose it should be deemed neutral.145  The Ward paragraph claims that 
the “principal inquiry” in the neutrality test is whether the government acted 
with an impermissible motive, and suggests that even deliberate burdens on 
particular speakers can be treated as “incidental.”146 
As we shall see below, since these changes to the content-neutrality test, 
many courts are committing precisely the sort of First Amendment errors 
Justice Brennan, Professor Stone, and others greatly feared with the original 
 
public demonstration on the streets or other public ways of the city, unless a permit therefore 
has been secured from the commission.”). 
 143. Renton, 475 U.S. at 57, 59 (Brennan J., dissenting) (“[B]oth the language of the 
ordinance and its dubious legislative history belie the Court’s conclusion that ‘the city’s 
pursuit of its zoning interests here was unrelated to the suppression of free expression.’ . . .  
Prior to the amendment, there was no indication that the ordinance was designed to address 
any ‘secondary effects’ a single adult theater might create.  In addition to the suspiciously 
coincidental timing of the amendment, many of the City Council’s ‘findings’ do not relate to 
legitimate land-use concerns.  As the Court of Appeals observed, ‘[b]oth the magistrate and 
the district court recognized that many of the stated reasons for the ordinance were no more 
than expressions of dislike for the subject matter.’” (second alteration in original)). 
 144. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48). 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. 
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adoption of the secondary effects doctrine.  But because courts are deciding 
these cases without express reference to the secondary effects doctrine and, 
instead, are purporting to use the traditional content-neutrality analysis, the 
dangers to the First Amendment have gone largely unnoticed. 
III.  THE WEAKENED CONTENT-NEUTRALITY TEST IN ACTION 
For the reasons set forth above, we believe that the secondary effects 
doctrine has distorted the standard content-neutrality analysis in many 
cases.  Our concern is that the subtle changes to the neutrality test have 
turned the test into a much more direct inquiry into governmental motive, 
which makes it much easier for governments to favor speech they like and 
disfavor speech they dislike. 
We have identified seven cases to demonstrate the weakened neutrality 
test in action, and to explain how that test differs from the traditional 
neutrality analysis. 
Our search for examples of this doctrinal problem proceeded as follows.  
First, because we believe Ward’s “principal inquiry” paragraph epitomizes 
the weakened, post-Renton neutrality approach, we searched for all federal 
cases using that formulation of the neutrality test.  This searched revealed 
more than 200 federal cases.  From within this 200, we narrowed the search 
further to examine (a) every Supreme Court case to use the formulation 
(there are three) and (b) every federal court of appeals case decided between 
2008 and 2012 to use the formulation (there are twenty-three). 
From within these smaller groups, below we present our analysis of 
seven cases in which either the Supreme Court or the courts of appeal get 
the content-neutrality analysis wrong in the ways we have described above.  
In particular, in reliance on the weakened neutrality analysis, these courts 
have treated laws as content neutral, even though they obviously fail the 
traditional neutrality inquiry described in Part I, by being content based in 
application, justification, or motivation. 
Notably, none of these cases concerns sexually explicit speech or adult 
businesses—the original target of the secondary effects doctrine.  Most 
actually concern core political speech.  Yet these cases exhibit all the 
hallmarks of the secondary effects doctrine:  an overemphasis on 
government motive, a willingness to allow laws that are content based and 
even viewpoint based in application to be treated as content neutral, and a 
largely ineffectual “justified without reference” analysis. 
A.  Weakened Content Neutrality at the Supreme Court:  
Turner, Madsen, and Hill 
There are three Supreme Court cases since Ward to rely on Ward’s 
“principal inquiry” paragraph as an authoritative statement of the content-
neutrality test:  Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,147 Madsen v. 
 
 147. 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
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Women’s Health Center, Inc.,148 and Hill v. Colorado.149  Each involves 
what was a very controversial content-neutrality analysis in an area other 
than sexually explicit speech.  None mentions or purports to employ the 
secondary effects test.  Yet each errs in deeming a content-based law to be 
content neutral in the exact ways we have described above, and in the exact 
ways predicted by Renton’s early critics. 
1.  Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC 
Five years after Ward, the Court had occasion to consider its content-
neutrality tests in the context of requirements that cable providers carry a 
certain amount of local broadcast programming.  As part of the Cable 
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,150 Congress 
imposed a wide range of requirements on the nation’s cable television 
industry.151  Turner concerned two such requirements, which were known 
as “must carry” provisions.  First, section 4 of the Act required cable 
companies to carry a specified number of local commercial broadcasting 
stations.152  Second, section 5 of the Act required cable companies to carry 
a specified number of local “noncommercial educational” channels.153 
These portions of the Act grew out of Congress’s concern that the 
success of cable companies would eventually crowd local broadcast stations 
out of the market entirely.154  In its findings, Congress explained the 
importance of the continued vitality of local broadcast stations, without 
which many viewers would not be able to receive programming.155  
Congress made clear that its interest in these stations was connected to its 
desire to “promot[e] a diversity of views,” and that “public television 
provides educational and informational programming to the Nation’s 
citizens, thereby advancing the Government’s compelling interest in 
educating its citizens.”156  Congress further explained, “A primary objective 
and benefit of our Nation’s system of regulation of television broadcasting 
is the local origination of programming.  There is a substantial 
governmental interest in ensuring its continuation.”157  Further, Congress 
stated, “Broadcast television stations continue to be an important source of 
local news and public affairs programming and other local broadcast 
services critical to an informed electorate.”158 
The Court began its neutrality analysis by noting, “Deciding whether a 
particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a 
 
 148. 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
 149. 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
 150. Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(6), (8), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461. 
 151. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 630. 
 152. See id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(B), (h)(1)(A) (1988)). 
 153. See id. at 631–32 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 535(a)). 
 154. See id. at 633–34. 
 155. See id. 
 156. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-385, § 2(a)(6), (8), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461. 
 157. Id. § 2(a)(10). 
 158. Id. § 2(a)(11). 
2013] NEUTRAL NO MORE 1217 
simple task.”159  The Court then noted Ward’s “principal inquiry” 
paragraph explaining that the “‘principal inquiry in determining content-
neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech 
because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it conveys.’”160  
The Court found that Congress had acted with a content-neutral purpose—
“to avoid the elimination of broadcast television” because “‘[s]uch 
programming is . . . free to those who own television sets and do not require 
cable transmission to receive broadcast television signals,’” and because 
“‘[t]here is a substantial governmental interest in promoting the continued 
availability of such free television programming, especially for viewers 
who are unable to afford other means of receiving programming.’”161 
Upon a closer analysis, it is clear that the must-carry provisions at issue 
in Turner actually failed all three of the traditional, pre-Renton content-
neutrality inquiries.  First, the law was content based in its application.  In 
order to determine whether a cable operator is complying, the FCC must 
look at and evaluate the content of the cable operator’s offerings to 
determine whether it includes a sufficient number of local commercial and 
noncommercial stations.  If a cable company is not complying, the remedy 
is to require a change in the content of the programming—to delete a 
certain number of channels the cable company wishes to provide, and to 
replace them with the government’s preferred channels. 
The law in Turner is also clearly content based in its justification and 
motivation.  As Congress’s findings make clear, the very point of the law is 
to preserve and protect a particular content that Congress finds valuable, 
namely local broadcast channels, because Congress viewed them as “‘an 
important source of local news [and] public affairs programming and other 
local broadcast services critical to an informed electorate.’”162  Further, 
Congress felt educational and informational programming advances “the 
Government’s compelling interest in educating its citizens,” and 
“promot[es] a diversity of views.”163  Thus, the justification for the law—
Congress’s view that preserving local broadcast stations will be 
beneficial—depended in large part on the content of their speech, which 
Congress valued.  Put another way, if the local broadcast channels decided 
to air mindless chatter or a plain blank screen, the must-carry rules would 
not serve the government’s purpose at all.  Accordingly, it cannot fairly be 
said that the law is “justified without reference” to the content of speech; to 
the contrary, the law was actually and expressly justified by Congress based 
 
 159. Turner, 512 U.S. at 642. 
 160. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
 161. Id. at 646 (quoting Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992 § 2(a)(12)). 
 162. Id. at 648 (quoting Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992 § 2(a)(11)); see also Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992 § 2. 
 163. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 § 2(a)(8)(A), 2(a)(6)). 
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on the content of speech of the local channels, and that interest is only 
served if the local channels have a particular content.164 
Under the traditional neutrality inquiry, therefore, the must-carry 
provisions of the Act should have been easily recognizable as content based 
and subjected to strict scrutiny.165  Nevertheless, by focusing largely on one 
particular neutral purpose, the Court in Turner declared them to be content 
neutral, and upheld them, exactly as one would expect under the secondary 
effects doctrine.  The Court did so without mentioning either the secondary 
effects doctrine or Renton. 
2.  Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. 
In Madsen, the Court considered the constitutionality of a state court 
injunction against protesters outside of a Florida abortion clinic.166  Among 
other things, the injunction established a thirty-six-foot buffer zone on the 
public sidewalks around the clinic into which the enjoined parties and 
anyone “acting in concert or participation with them” could not enter.167 
In evaluating whether the injunction was content-neutral or content-
based, the Court began with Ward:  “Our principal inquiry in determining 
content-neutrality is whether the government has adopted a regulation of 
speech ‘without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’”168  The 
Court therefore stated that “the government’s purpose” is “the threshold 
consideration.”169  The Court found this purpose analysis to be simple: 
 Here, the state court imposed restrictions on petitioners incidental to 
their antiabortion message because they repeatedly violated the court’s 
original order.  That petitioners all share the same viewpoint regarding 
abortion does not in itself demonstrate that some invidious content- or 
viewpoint-based purpose motivated the issuance of the order.  It suggests 
only that those in the group whose conduct violated the court’s order 
 
 164. The four dissenting justices—Sandra Day O’Connor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Antonin 
Scalia, and Clarence Thomas—recognized this point, saying that they “cannot avoid the 
conclusion that [Congress’s] preference for broadcasters over cable programmers is justified 
with reference to content.  The findings, enacted by Congress as § 2 of the Act . . . make this 
clear.” Id.  Neither the majority nor the dissent, however, drew the connection to Renton as 
the reason for the majority’s weak justification analysis. 
 165. The Court rejected the government’s suggestion that a relaxed First Amendment 
standard should be applied because the law involved television stations.  The Court 
explained that, while the First Amendment allows the government a freer hand in regulating 
broadcast airwaves—which are limited and require some level of regulation in order to be 
useable—no such relaxed standard is needed in the cable field, because cable technology 
essentially allows a limitless number of speakers. See id. at 636–37.  However, the Court did 
emphasize that it would only permit differential regulation of cable stations because of the 
“bottleneck” control that cable providers have since they control an “essential pathway” for 
cable speech and can “silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the 
switch.” Id. at 656. 
 166. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
 167. See id. at 759–61. 
 168. Id. at 763 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
 169. Id. 
2013] NEUTRAL NO MORE 1219 
happen to share the same opinion regarding abortions being performed at 
the clinic.170 
For these reasons, the Court concluded that the injunction was content 
neutral.171 
The Court’s analysis of the judge’s motivation in entering the 
injunction—while characterized as a “threshold” consideration—was 
actually the beginning, middle, and end of its content-neutrality analysis.  
Having found that the judge was motivated to stop recurrent law breaking, 
rather than to penalize abortion opponents because of their message, the 
Court considered its content analysis complete. 
Had the Court continued—had it analyzed whether the law was content 
based in its application and its justification under the standard neutrality 
inquiry described in Part I, supra—the Court would have easily concluded 
that the injunction was, in fact, content based. 
First and foremost, the Court’s motivation inquiry allowed it to ignore 
the express evidence in the record showing that the injunction was content 
and viewpoint based in its application.  In other words, how and whether 
the injunction applied to particular individuals turned entirely on the 
content and viewpoint of their speech.  In particular, the trial court 
repeatedly indicated that it would simply treat those who speak against 
abortion as necessarily “acting in concert” with the enjoined parties, as 
illustrated by the following exchanges: 
 Mr. Lacy:  “I was wondering how we can—why we were arrested and 
confined as being in concert with these people that we don’t know, when 
other people weren’t, that were in that same buffer zone, and it was kind 
of selective as to who was picked and who was arrested and who was 
obtained for the same buffer zone in the same public injunction.” 
 The Court:  “Mr. Lacy, I understand that those on the other side of the 
issue [abortion-rights supporters] were also in the area.  If you are 
referring to them, the Injunction did not pertain to those on the other side 
of the issue, because the word in concert with means in concert with those 
who had taken a certain position in respect to the clinic, adverse to the 
clinic.  If you are saying that is the selective basis that the pro-choice 
were not arrested when pro-life was arrested, that’s the basis of that 
selection. . . .” 
 . . . . 
 John Doe No. 16:  “I also understand that the reason why I was 
arrested was because I acted in concert with those who were 
demonstrating pro-life.  I guess the question that I’m asking is, were the 
beliefs in ideologies of the people that were present, were those taken into 
consideration when we were arrested? . . .  When you issued the 
Injunction did you determine that it would only apply to—that it would 
apply only to people that were demonstrating that were pro-life?” 
 The Court:  “In effect, yes.” 
 
 170. Id. (first emphasis added). 
 171. Id. 
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 . . . . 
 John Doe No. 31:  “How did the police determine that I was acting in 
concert with some organization that was named on this injunction? I again 
am a person who haven’t [sic] seen this injunction.  So how did the police 
determine that I was acting in concert?” 
 The Court:  “They observed your activities and determined in their 
minds whether or not what you were doing was in concert with the—I 
gather the pro-life position of the other, of the named Defendants.”172 
These statements confirm that the injunction was, in fact, both content and 
viewpoint based in application.  Both the court and the police decided who 
was subject to the injunction based on the content and viewpoint of their 
speech.  All speakers who were (a) speaking about a particular content 
(abortion) and (b) a particular viewpoint (opposed to abortion) were 
automatically deemed to be “acting in concert” with the people who had 
previously been found to have violated the law. 
In this regard, the injunction should have been immediately recognizable 
as content based in its application—indeed, this is the easiest sort of content 
problem to spot, and the judge admitted to using content and viewpoint to 
determine whether the injunction would apply to new speakers who had 
never met the original lawbreakers.  Yet the Supreme Court allowed its 
emphasis on the “threshold” question of motive to trump this clear content 
problem. 
Relatedly, the excerpts from the trial court also reveal that the injunction 
was not “justified without reference to the content of speech.”  If it were, 
the court would have applied the injunction against all speakers in the 
thirty-six-foot zone, not simply pro-life speakers.  But the exact opposite 
happened:  speakers who supported abortion were given free rein on the 
public sidewalk, while those who opposed abortion were subject to the 
injunction, even if they had never met or collaborated with the original 
lawbreakers.  Clearly the court did not think the injunction was justified for 
all speech or all speakers; rather, the court determined which speakers the 
injunction applied to based, and apparently only based, on the court’s 
“reference to the content of speech.” 
The Court in Madsen, however, conducted no inquiry into the law’s 
application or whether its justification depended on content.  Instead, the 
Court simply used its “threshold” analysis of the judge’s motive to end the 
neutrality inquiry.  This is perhaps not surprising given the Court’s post-
Renton elevation of motive analysis as the “principal inquiry” in content 
neutrality.  As discussed in Part II.A, supra, this is also precisely how the 
secondary effects doctrine itself proceeds.  Yet neither the doctrine nor 
Renton is mentioned in the opinion. 
 
 172. Id. at 795–97 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
2013] NEUTRAL NO MORE 1221 
3.  Hill v. Colorado 
In Hill v. Colorado,173 the Court again addressed abortion protests, this 
time in the context of a Colorado ordinance regulating speech outside of 
medical facilities.  The law provided, 
No person shall knowingly approach another person within eight feet of 
such person, unless such other person consents, for the purpose of passing 
a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, 
education, or counseling with such other person in the public way or 
sidewalk area within a radius of one hundred feet from any entrance door 
to a health care facility.174 
The Supreme Court upheld the statute as content neutral.175  Writing for 
the Court, Justice Stevens began with Ward’s language about the inquiry 
into motive being the “principal inquiry” for content neutrality.176  Then 
Justice Stevens explained that Colorado’s buffer zone statute was content 
neutral for “three independent reasons.”177  First, the law was “not a 
‘regulation of speech,’” but rather “of the places where some speech may 
occur.”178  Second, Justice Stevens stated that the facial applicability to all 
speech, as opposed to just antiabortion speech, proved its content 
neutrality.179  Finally, he noted that the state’s interest in protecting access 
and privacy is unrelated to the content of the demonstrators’ speech, 
rendering the law content neutral because it was “justified without reference 
to the content of regulated speech.”180  The Court rejected the petitioners’ 
suggestions that the requirement for law enforcement officers to determine 
 
 173. 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
 174. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1249 n.4 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) (citing 6 COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 18-9-122 (1993)). 
 175. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 714. 
 176. Id. at 719. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.  This is a particularly odd statement by the Court.  On this analysis, all time, 
place, and manner regulations are no longer regulations of speech but simply regulations “of 
the places where speech may occur.” Id.  Both before and since Hill, however, the Court has 
treated time, place, and manner regulations as regulations of speech, and has subjected them 
to strict scrutiny (when they are content based) or intermediate scrutiny (when they are not). 
See, e.g., Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2011) (approving a 
limitation on speech at a particular legislative session as “a reasonable time, place and 
manner limitation”); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (applying strict 
scrutiny to a regulation limiting places for nonlabor protests). 
  Indeed, the Court’s argument here contradicts all of its time, place, and manner 
jurisprudence, because the time, place, and manner test itself applies only when there has 
been some regulation of speech. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992) 
(plurality opinion) (explaining that the “time, place, and manner” test applies to regulations 
of expressive activity). 
 179. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 719. 
 180. Id. at 720 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).  As will 
be discussed infra, the Court simply stated the government interests and, without analysis, 
proclaimed that those interests are not related to content. Id. at 719.  This pronouncement 
stands in stark contrast to the detailed analysis that occurred, for example, in Eichman. 
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whether speech was “protest, education, or counseling” rendered the law 
content based.181 
As in Turner and Madsen, the content-neutrality analysis in Hill bears the 
imprint of Renton and the secondary effects doctrine.  First, the Court began 
by emphasizing the government’s purpose as the controlling consideration.  
From this point, the Court then ignored the quite express emphasis on 
content in the text of the law itself:  approaches to engage in certain types of 
speech (“protest, education, or counseling”) were banned, while approaches 
to speak in other ways (i.e., idle chatter, asking a question, selling a 
product, etc.) were left unregulated.  Thus it seems very clear that the 
application of the law depended on the content of speech.182 
Worse, the Court applied a weak version of the justification inquiry, 
seemingly only asking whether the state had named a neutral justification 
for the law.  In particular, the Court stated that government interests in 
“access” and “privacy” are “unrelated to the content of the demonstrators’ 
speech.”183  At one level, of course, this is obviously correct:  the 
government might seek to protect an interest in access to medical care or an 
interest in privacy in ways that have nothing to do with anyone else’s 
speech.  In such circumstances a law serving those interests may well be 
“justified without reference to the content of speech.” 
But in Hill, the only law before the Court was a law that purported to 
protect access and privacy by outlawing certain approaches near medical 
facilities—and only when the approach is made with the intent to speak.  
That is, if a person approached an incoming patient silently and without 
carrying a leaflet or holding a sign, the approach is perfectly permissible 
under the law at issue in Hill.  It is only if that approach is combined with 
an intent to engage in certain types of speech that the approach becomes 
punishable. 
Had the Court applied the type of justification test we saw in O’Brien, 
Clark, and Eichman, it would have found that the law was not justified 
without reference to the content of speech.  As discussed in Part I, in 
O’Brien, the state interest was in preserving Selective Service records; in 
Clark, the interest was in maintaining clean and accessible parks; in 
 
 181. See id.  Justice Stevens explained that the law often looks at the content of a 
communication to determine the speaker’s purpose, and to determine, for example, whether 
a communication is a threat, blackmail, an offer to sell securities, or an agreement to fix 
prices. See id. at 720–21. 
 182. The Court’s reasoning here—that sometimes it is permissible to look at the content 
of speech to determine if it falls into a category like bribery or copyright violations, which 
have always been understood to be “outside” the First Amendment—seems particularly out 
of place when discussing what the Court acknowledges as core protected First Amendment 
speech. See id. at 715 (noting that the plaintiffs’ “leafleting, sign displays, and oral 
communications are protected by the First Amendment”).  The Court is, of course, correct 
that courts must take the content of speech into account to determine whether the speech at 
issue falls outside of the First Amendment’s protection, but it had never before asserted that 
this practice allows legislatures to impose content-based regulations of core protected 
speech. 
 183. Id. at 720. 
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Eichman, the interest was in protecting the flag as a national symbol.184  
None of these interests facially involves the content of speech.  It was only 
by questioning how the regulation at issue actually served the asserted 
interest that the Court was able to distinguish the content-based justification 
in Eichman from the content-neutral justifications in O’Brien and Clark. 
The Court in Hill never probed this connection.  The justification inquiry 
had withered to asking only whether the state purported to have some 
neutral motive.  This exactly replicates the secondary effects doctrine, 
except that in Hill the speech was core political speech in the public forum, 
rather than an adult business. 
Had the Court seriously probed whether the law was, in fact, justified 
without reference to the content of speech, it would have been forced to 
conclude that the law fails that test.  The Colorado law did not even apply 
to all approaches.  Rather, it only punished approaching speakers, and only 
those speakers who wanted to engage in a particular type of speech (protest, 
education, or counseling).  Thus the legislature apparently did not believe 
that all approaches, or even all speaking approaches, triggered its interests 
in preserving access and privacy.  The only logical reason to believe that 
some speaking approaches will threaten access or impinge on privacy is if 
the legislature (and later the Court) is implicitly assuming the content of the 
speech to be something unwelcome.  Approaching to say, “Good luck on 
your surgery today,” or, “Would you like to buy some Girl Scout cookies?” 
or, “The hospital down the street has better doctors,” would neither threaten 
access nor privacy. 
In this manner, there can be no serious doubt that the law in Hill was not 
“justified without reference to the content of speech.”  Instead, the law only 
made sense as applied to speakers who oppose a medical procedure 
(chiefly, abortion).  Following the traditional content analysis, the Court 
should therefore have deemed the law content-based and applied strict 
scrutiny.185 
 
 184. See supra Part I.B. 
 185. The Court’s content analysis in Hill has garnered widespread criticism.  Justice 
Kennedy wrote that the opinion contradicted “more than a half century of well-established 
First Amendment principles.” Hill, 530 U.S. at 765 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1298 (2007) (citing 
Hill for the proposition that “Court majorities have unconvincingly denied that the predicate 
conditions for strict scrutiny actually exist—for example, by maintaining that a content-
based restriction on speech is not really content-based”); John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 
85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1127 (2005) (pointing out that, in applying the Hill analysis, “one 
must necessarily examine the content of a person’s speech to determine if it constitutes 
‘education, protest or counseling’” (quoting Hill, 530 U.S. at 707)); Michael W. McConnell, 
Professor, Univ. of Utah Coll. of Law, Remarks at the Symposium Conducted in Honor of 
the Inauguration of Andrew K. Benton As the Seventh President of Pepperdine University 
(Sept. 23, 2000), in 28 PEPP. L. REV. 747, 748 (2001) (“You cannot tell, other than by the 
content of what I say, whether the law [in Hill] is being violated or not.  Now if that is not 
content-based, I just do not know what ‘content-based’ could possibly mean.”); Sullivan, 
supra note 6, at 737 (“Hill showed a striking readiness to accept the Colorado legislature’s 
effort to draw a facially neutral statute to achieve goals clearly targeting particular 
content.”); cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Professor, Univ. of S. Cal., Remarks at the Symposium 
Conducted in Honor of the Inauguration of Andrew K. Benton As the Seventh President of 
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4.  Counterexample:  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. 
To be clear, the Supreme Court does not always employ the type of 
weakened content-neutrality analysis we have described above.  In fact, in 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,186 the Court recently demonstrated that it 
remains quite capable of applying the standard neutrality analysis discussed 
in Part I, supra. 
Sorrell concerned a Vermont law that limited the dissemination of 
pharmacy records about the prescribing practices of different doctors.187  
The state asserted what appeared to be neutral interests—protecting patient 
privacy, protecting doctors from harassment by sales representatives, 
lowering the cost of medical services, and promoting the public health.188 
Rather than simply accept these facially neutral interests and deem the 
law content neutral—as courts applying the weakened neutrality test we 
have described above might do—the Court instead applied the traditional 
content-neutrality inquiry to deem the law content based.  In particular, the 
Court found that because the Vermont law allows use of the information for 
“educational communications” but not for marketing purposes, the statute 
“thus disfavors marketing, that is, speech with a particular content.”189  
Notably, this is the exact opposite of the approach the Court took in Hill, 
which saw no content-based restrictions imposing special burdens on 
“protest, education, or counseling” that were not imposed on other speech.  
Even though the Court acknowledged that many of Vermont’s goals were 
permissible, it unequivocally held that those goals could not be advanced by 
selectively regulating speech based on its content or the identity of the 
speaker.  Thus, the Court in Sorrell completely avoided the doctrinal errors 
set forth in Part II above. 
As we will discuss in Part IV below, the fact that there are still Supreme 
Court decisions applying this more traditional content-neutrality inquiry is 
heartening, and provides lower courts with an avenue for avoiding the 
doctrinal problems set forth above. 
However, as we demonstrate in the next section, the existence of the 
doctrinal problems described in Part II, and demonstrated in Turner, 
Madsen, and Hill is currently leading many courts of appeals to endorse 
content- and viewpoint-based laws as neutral. 
 
Pepperdine University (Sept. 23, 2000), in 28 PEPP. L. REV. 752, 752–53 (2001) (agreeing 
with the result in Hill but disagreeing with the Court’s rationale:  “Where I become 
concerned is where the Court tried to find a content-neutral regulation, and the problem is 
the whole doctrine of content neutrality right now is quite confused. . . .  [And] this case 
further adds to the confusion”). 
 186. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 187. Id. at 2659. 
 188. See id. at 2668, 2670. 
 189. Id. at 2663. 
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B.  Weakened Content Neutrality in the Courts of Appeals 
A review of recent cases from the federal courts of appeals suggests that 
the Renton-inspired neutrality inquiry is being used to allow governments to 
pick and choose which private messages will get favored or disfavored 
treatment from the government in the public forum.  This is precisely the 
danger Renton’s early critics predicted, and it is occurring frequently in the 
courts of appeals, without mention of the secondary effects doctrine. 
In order to demonstrate further the extent of the current problems caused 
by this weakened content-neutrality analysis, we have selected four recent 
cases decided by the federal courts of appeals for analysis below.  These 
cases show the use of this weaker neutrality analysis to uphold laws that 
should have been easily classified as content based and sometimes 
viewpoint based in the contexts of school dress codes, abortion clinic buffer 
zones, satellite television regulation, and parade permitting schemes. 
As with the Supreme Court cases discussed above, none of these cases 
concerns sexually explicit speech, and none expressly applies Renton or the 
secondary effects doctrine.  Yet each, in effect, applies the weakened 
neutrality analysis we have described to content-based restrictions on core 
protected First Amendment activity. 
1.  School Dress Codes 
In Palmer ex rel. Palmer v. Waxahachie Independent School District,190 
the Fifth Circuit considered the constitutionality of a public school dress 
code.  The dress code at issue in Palmer generally prohibited students from 
wearing shirts with messages.  However, the school district created 
exceptions for shirts with “small logos” and, most importantly, for 
“principal-approved” shirts that promoted school clubs, organizations, 
athletic teams, or school spirit.191 
Although it is clear that the First Amendment does not always apply with 
its usual rigor in the public school context,192 the court purported to apply 
the same content-neutrality inquiry applicable elsewhere under the First 
Amendment.193  In applying the neutrality test, the court did acknowledge 
the “general rule” that laws that “‘distinguish favored speech from 
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content 
based.’”194  However, the court relied on the Renton-inspired “principal 
 
 190. 579 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 191. See id. at 505 n.1. 
 192. See generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. 
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 193. See Palmer, 579 F.3d at 506 (“The ‘loss of First Amendment freedoms for even 
minimal periods of time constitutes irreparable injury justifying the grant of a preliminary 
injunction.’  Because ‘[w]ords printed on clothing qualify as pure speech and are protected 
under the First Amendment,’ the dress code’s ban on his shirts would cause Palmer 
irreparable injury.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of Deerfield 
Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981), and Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. 
Bd., 240 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2001)). 
 194. Id. at 509 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1994)). 
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inquiry” test—in fact, citing Ward, Turner, and Hill together195—to find 
that the dress code was nevertheless content neutral because it was not 
designed to suppress unpopular speech.  The court explained: 
 The District was in no way attempting to suppress any student’s 
expression through its dress code—a critical fact based on earlier student 
speech cases—so the dress code is content-neutral.  Its allowance for 
school logos and school-sponsored shirts does not suppress unpopular 
viewpoints but provides students with more clothing options than they 
would have had under a complete ban on messages.196 
Under the traditional neutrality test, it should have been clear that a law 
that allows the government to choose certain pre-approved messages that 
will be permitted—and to ban all other messages—is content based.197  Yet 
the court—without citing Renton and without mentioning the secondary 
effects doctrine—simply declared the law to be content neutral because of a 
nondiscriminatory purpose.198 
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar result, with similar reasoning, in 
Jacobs v. Clark County School District.199  Relying on the “principal 
inquiry” language from Ward, the court found a dress code that 
discriminated between permissible and impermissible messages to be 
content neutral.200  The court emphasized that the school district’s policy 
had a neutral motive because it 
[wa]s aimed at “increasing student achievement, promoting safety, and 
enhancing a positive school environment.”  Nothing in the Regulation’s 
language suggests it was directed at the type of messages or specific 
viewpoints previously conveyed by students’ wardrobe choices; indeed, 
the record evidence unambiguously indicates that the District’s purpose in 
enacting the Regulation was to further the Regulation’s stated goals, not 
to suppress the expression of particular ideas.201 
As in the Fifth Circuit, therefore, the Ninth Circuit allowed the presence 
of such neutral motives to permit a law that was expressly based on content 
(pro-school logos were permitted, but all other messages were prohibited) 
to be treated as content neutral.202 
This move by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits—allowing the asserted 
existence of a content-neutral motive to overcome the express content-
based application of a law—is precisely how the secondary effects doctrine 
 
 195. See id. at 510 n.12 (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000)). 
 196. Id. at 510. 
 197. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 66 (1983) 
(noting that “viewpoint discrimination implicates core First Amendment values” and is thus 
content based); see also supra Part I. 
 198. See Palmer, 579 F.3d at 510 (“The District was in no way attempting to suppress 
any student’s expression through its dress code—a critical fact based on earlier student 
speech cases—so the dress code is content-neutral.”). 
 199. 526 F.3d 419, 432–33 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 200. Id. at 432 & n.30. 
 201. Id. at 432. 
 202. Id. at 433. 
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works.203  Thus, these courts are basically applying the secondary effects 
doctrine as part of their standard neutrality analysis.204 
2.  Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones 
In McCullen v. Coakley,205 the First Circuit upheld a Massachusetts 
abortion clinic buffer zone law.  The statute at issue created zones on public 
streets and sidewalks extending thirty-five feet in all directions from all 
entrances, exits, and driveways of stand-alone abortion clinics.  Although 
passersby were permitted to cross through the zones, most speakers were 
not permitted to enter the zone to engage in speech or advocacy.  The law 
made an exception for employees and agents of the abortion clinics, who 
were exempt from the law, and therefore permitted to operate within the 
zones.206 
The district court had upheld the law as content neutral “relying mainly 
on Hill.”207  The Act, however, had several key differences from Hill, 
including that (a) Hill applied to all medical facilities, while the 
Massachusetts law applied only at abortion clinics; (b) Hill applied equally 
to all speakers, while the Massachusetts law exempted speakers from the 
clinics; and (c) Hill was limited to unwanted speech, while the 
Massachusetts law criminalized all speech (other than by clinic speakers) 
within the zones, even if the speech was invited by the listener.208  The 
district court found that the Act even prohibited merely wearing T-shirts 
with “abortion-related” messages on them while legally passing through the 
zone to go elsewhere.209 
The First Circuit did not believe that any of these differences mattered at 
all.  After beginning with the familiar “principal inquiry” language from 
Ward, the First Circuit dismissed these differences from Hill as immaterial.  
 
 203. Cf. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1986) (holding an 
ordinance content neutral because it “is aimed not at the content of the films shown at ‘adult 
motion picture theatres,’ but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the 
surrounding community” because the Government’s proffered interest was not 
“predominant[ly]” content based). 
 204. Indeed, these decisions presumably would allow the schools to ban the message on 
the sign in Mosley itself (“Jones High School Practices Black Discrimination”) yet allow 
pro-school messages (“Jones High School Is Great!”). See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 
408 U.S. 92, 93 (1972).  This approach therefore turns content neutrality on its head, 
allowing government preference of certain messages in precisely the way Mosley said was 
impermissible. 
 205. 571 F.3d 167, 178 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (June 24, 2013) 
(No. 12-1168).  The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in McCullen and will hear the 
case in early 2014. McCullen, 133 S. Ct. at 2857.  One of us (Rienzi) is counsel of record for 
the speakers in that case. 
 206. McCullen, 571 F.3d at 177–78. 
 207. Id. at 176. 
 208. Compare MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266 § 120E1/2(a), (b)(1)–(2), (d), (f) (LexisNexis 
2007), with Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726–27 (2000). 
 209. See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 F. Supp. 2d 382, 423 n.294 (D. Mass. 2008) (finding 
that “displaying signs or shirts with abortion-related or partisan messages clearly qualifies” 
as a violation of the law, even for passersby who may otherwise legally walk through the 
zones). 
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The court explained:  “it suffices to say that the mere fact that a content-
neutral law has a disparate impact on particular kinds of speech is 
insufficient, without more, to ground an inference that the disparity results 
from a content-based preference.”210  For this reason, and relying on prior 
buffer zone cases in the circuit, the court found the Massachusetts law 
content neutral.211 
The First Circuit’s neutrality decision defies the standard content-
neutrality inquiry, and even defies the weakened version of that inquiry as it 
was conducted in Hill.  In particular, the legislature’s decision to allow 
speech on the public sidewalks by abortion clinic employees, but not by 
their pro-life opponents, is obviously impermissible.212  As the Supreme 
Court found in Mosley, the government does not have the authority to 
“grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but 
deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial 
views.”213  In fact, the Court in Hill—which itself applied a weakened 
version of the neutrality inquiry (as discussed supra)—expressly stated that 
neutrality requires equal treatment of all speakers: 
 The statute . . . applies to all “protest,” to all “counseling,” and to all 
demonstrators whether or not the demonstration concerns abortion, and 
whether they oppose or support the woman who has made an abortion 
decision.  That is the level of neutrality that the Constitution demands.214 
Thus, contrary even to Hill, the First Circuit upheld a law as neutral that did 
not apply equally to all speakers in the public forum, and particularly 
favored a group of speakers who support the abortion decision.215  As the 
district court found, this favoritism was not accidental—rather, the law was 
enacted “to make crystal clear . . . that those who work to secure peaceful 
access to [the clinic] need not fear prosecution.”216  The law thus does not 
provide “the level of neutrality that the Constitution demands,” even under 
Hill. 
The First Circuit also failed to examine adequately whether the law in 
McCullen was “justified without reference to the content of speech.”217  
Given the fact that the law permits passersby to walk through the same 
 
 210. McCullen, 571 F.3d at 177. 
 211. Id. at 178. 
 212. Cf. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992) (plurality opinion) (finding that a 
statute that determines “[w]hether individuals may exercise their free speech rights near 
polling places depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a political campaign” 
and is a content-based regulation because the law favored some speech and disfavored other 
speech). 
 213. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). 
 214. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 215. See McCullen, 571 F.3d at 176–77. 
 216. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 F. Supp. 2d 382, 406 (D. Mass. 2008).  The trial court 
also concluded that the exemption was permissible based on the theory that speakers from 
the abortion clinic would be “less likely to engage in directing of unwanted speech” toward 
incoming patients. Id. at 407. 
 217. See McCullen, 571 F.3d at 177 (concluding that to the extent there was a “disparate 
impact” on pro-life speech, there was “no more” to suggest that the statute was only justified 
by referencing the content of speech). 
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zones, and simply prohibits people walking through the zone from also 
expressing their views about abortion in the zone, it is impossible to believe 
that the government’s justification is unrelated to the content of speech.  If 
the government’s interest is triggered by a passerby saying “abortion is 
bad,” but not a passerby remaining silent or saying “the Red Sox are bad,” 
then the interest is clearly related to the content of speech.218 
In sum, the law upheld as neutral in McCullen should have been analyzed 
as content based because it is content based in its application (some speech 
and speakers are permitted, while others can be imprisoned), in its 
justification (the legislature clearly believed its interests were not threatened 
by silent passersby, or by speakers from one side of the debate), and in its 
motivation (a government desire to protect speech offering access to 
abortion, but not speech offering access to abortion alternatives).  Yet the 
First Circuit deemed this government favoritism in its regulation of 
peaceful speech on a public sidewalk to be completely neutral, because it 
relied on the Renton-driven “principal inquiry” analysis instead of applying 
the traditional neutrality tests.219 
3.  Satellite Television Regulation 
In DISH Network Corp. v. FCC,220 the Ninth Circuit considered the 
constitutionality and content neutrality of FCC regulations requiring 
satellite television providers to carry “qualified noncommercial educational 
television stations” on their system.221 
In order to be a “qualified noncommercial educational television station,” 
a station needs to be eligible for a Corporation for Public Broadcasting 
(CPB) grant.222  CPB grants, in turn, impose certain content criteria, namely 
that 
applicants must devote the substantial majority of their daily total 
programming hours to general audience programming that serves 
demonstrated community needs of an educational, informational and 
cultural nature.  Programs that further the principles of particular political 
or religious philosophies do not qualify.223 
 
 218. As noted in Part I.B, supra, the flag-burning context is comparable.  There, the 
government’s asserted interests were only threatened by burnings with a certain message, 
and the Court thus determined the regulations were content based and subjected to strict 
scrutiny. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397 (1989).  Indeed, the district court found that the plaintiffs were barred from “expressing 
their views about abortion”—even “displaying signs or shirts with abortion-related or 
partisan messages” would violate the law. McCullen, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 423. 
 219. The First Circuit’s decision is now in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s recent 
conclusion in Hoye v. City of Oakland. See 653 F.3d 835, 851 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The City’s 
policy of distinguishing between speech that facilitates access to clinics and speech that 
discourages access is not content-neutral.  It is the epitome of a content-based speech 
restriction.”).  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the McCullen decision in June 
2013. McCullen v. Coakley, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (June 24, 2013) (No. 12-1168). 
 220. 653 F.3d 771, 778–80 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 778 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
1230 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
The imposition of content criteria for the stations required to be carried in 
DISH Network thus distinguished the case from Turner.  In Turner, the 
majority concluded that the must-carry regulations “do not burden or 
benefit speech of a particular content” and therefore could be deemed 
content neutral.224  Rather than forcing cable companies to carry channels 
broadcasting particular content, the regulations at issue in Turner simply 
required the cable companies to carry certain types of channels (i.e., local 
broadcast channels), regardless of their programming content.225 
Nevertheless, applying the weakened content-neutrality analysis we have 
described, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the regulations in DISH 
Network were content neutral, even though they required carrying channels 
with a government-dictated content (and with government imposed 
proscriptions on programming that furthered “particular political or 
religious philosophies”). 
The Ninth Circuit arrived at this counterintuitive conclusion in familiar 
fashion.  It began its analysis with the Ward “principal inquiry” formulation 
of the neutrality doctrine.226  The court then stated a seemingly neutral 
interest:  that Congress merely sought to “guard against the influence of 
special interests” and “even the playing field” to “prohibit satellite carriers 
from ‘discriminating’ against noncommercial stations.”227  The court 
therefore found that the law “serves interests unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression,” citing Renton.228  Accordingly, the court found that the 
regulation “seeks to support expression, not suppress it” and is content 
neutral.229 
Had the court actually applied the traditional neutrality test, the law 
would have been easily classified as content based.  First, the law is content 
based in its application:  the government is ordering the satellite broadcaster 
to carry stations with a particular government-required content, and with a 
government-imposed limitation on programs with less favored content (i.e., 
those that further “particular political or religious philosophies”).  Nor 
could the regulations be defended as “justified without reference to the 
content of speech.”  Indeed, if noncommercial stations carried the exact 
same programming as the commercial stations, there would be no 
justification for the regulations at all. 
In short, even if the regulations in Turner really could be considered 
neutral (because they applied to all local broadcasters regardless of 
content), there is no plausible argument that the requirements in DISH 
Network are content neutral in their application, justification, or motivation.  
Nevertheless, applying the weakened neutrality test, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the regulations as neutral. 
 
 224. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 645 (1994). 
 225. We disagree with the Court’s neutrality arguments in Turner, for the reasons set 
forth above. 
 226. DISH Network, 653 F.3d at 778. 
 227. Id. at 779. 
 228. Id. at 778. 
 229. Id. at 779. 
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4.  Parade Permitting 
Reasonable people might disagree as to whether, as a policy matter, there 
are good reasons for wanting to allow school districts somewhat greater 
authority over the messages on student clothing than we would accept in 
other contexts.  But the broader danger of cases like Palmer and Jacobs 
(discussed in Part III.B.1, supra) is that the courts are purporting to apply 
the standard neutrality analysis—i.e., the same analysis they would and 
should provide to core political speech in any sidewalk demonstration or 
parade—yet they are creating precedents using the Renton-driven, weaker 
content analysis in ways that will inevitably apply more broadly. 
This is precisely what has occurred in the Fifth Circuit on the question of 
whether the government can single out government favored political 
messages for special treatment in parade regulations. 
In International Women’s Day March Planning Committee v. City of San 
Antonio, the Fifth Circuit recently considered whether a San Antonio parade 
permit scheme was content neutral or content based.230  Under the scheme, 
organizers of most parades were required to pay government-imposed fees 
for police and cleanup activities.231  The city decided, however, that there 
were certain parades which it wanted to exempt from these requirements.  
Therefore, the fees were not applicable to certain parades, including parades 
to celebrate Martin Luther King Jr. Day and Veterans Day.232 
The plaintiffs in the case—who were seeking a permit for a parade to 
celebrate International Women’s Day—argued that the scheme was content 
based, in that the city was preferring parades with certain government-
approved messages, but charging fees to other marchers.233 
Using the Renton-inspired “principal inquiry” analysis, the court 
nevertheless deemed the scheme entirely neutral, even though it expressly 
found that the law was designed to favor certain messages in the public 
forum.  The court reasoned that the city was not trying to suppress anyone’s 
message, but instead had “singl[ed] out a limited number of favored 
messages for special treatment.”234  The court found this was permissible 
under Palmer, its school dress code case discussed above.235 
This approach is flagrantly content based under all three aspects of the 
traditional content analysis.  First, the preference is content based in 
application:  parades with certain government-approved messages and 
themes receive free use of the streets while others must pay.  Second, the 
preference is obviously not justified without reference to the content of 
speech—indeed, the content of speech was the very reason the city wanted 
to waive fees for certain parades.  And third, as even the Fifth Circuit’s 
 
 230. Int’l Women’s Day March Planning Comm. v. City of San Antonio, 619 F.3d 346 
(5th Cir. 2010). 
 231. Id. at 350. 
 232. Id. at 353. 
 233. Id. at 354–55. 
 234. Id. at 361. 
 235. Id. 
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analysis demonstrates, the law is intended to identify “favored messages” 
which will be “singl[ed] out” for “special treatment” in the regulation of the 
public forum.236  Thus, the law also has an obviously content-based 
motivation. 
The Fifth Circuit’s analysis should be shocking.  The core, blackletter 
teaching of the quintessential content-neutrality case—Police Department 
of Chicago v. Mosley—is that the government cannot “grant the use of a 
forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those 
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.”237  Yet here 
the Fifth Circuit is deeming content neutral a law that the court openly 
acknowledges to be designed to “single out . . . favored messages” and give 
them preferential treatment in the public forum.  Moreover, the court 
arrived at this result not with express application of the secondary effects 
doctrine, but by purporting to use the standard content-neutrality analysis, 
which has been warped over time. 
5.  Counterexample:  Hoye v. City of Oakland 
Despite the cases discussed above, there remain courts of appeals 
decisions that avoid the doctrinal pitfalls discussed in Part II.  The Ninth 
Circuit’s recent decision in Hoye v. City of Oakland238 provides a useful 
example. 
In Hoye, the Ninth Circuit confronted an abortion clinic statute modeled 
on the Colorado law upheld by the Supreme Court in Hill.  Like the law in 
Hill, the Oakland statute on its face applied to all speakers, including 
speakers from abortion clinics.239  However, the City of Oakland enforced 
the law in a discriminatory way:  it treated all speakers offering access to 
abortion as automatically exempt, while it treated speakers offering access 
to abortion alternatives (such as adoption) as covered by the law.240  This is 
the same type of speaker discrimination that was written into the 
Massachusetts statute upheld as neutral by the First Circuit in McCullen. 
Unlike the First Circuit, however, the Ninth Circuit did not apply the 
weakened, Renton-driven content-neutrality analysis described in the cases 
above.  Instead, the Ninth Circuit correctly found that Oakland’s 
preferential treatment of some speakers on the public sidewalk “is the 
epitome of a content-based speech restriction.”241  The court reached this 
conclusion by applying the traditional application inquiry described in Part 
I above (“a regulation is content-based if . . . the regulation, by its very 
 
 236. Id. at 361. 
 237. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). 
 238. 653 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 239. Id. at 851. 
 240. Id. at 850–51 (“At oral argument, the City confirmed that it would not enforce the 
Ordinance against an escort who approached a patient, without consent, and said, ‘May I 
help you into the clinic?’ but that it would enforce it against a sidewalk counselor who said, 
‘May I talk to you about alternatives to the clinic?’”). 
 241. Id. at 851. 
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terms, singles out particular content for differential treatment”)242 and by 
reciting the familiar, pre-Renton standard from Mosley that the government 
“may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds 
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more 
controversial views.”243 
IV.  SEVERAL PATHS TO RESTORING THE CONTENT-NEUTRALITY TEST 
The very idea that the government would “single out favored messages” 
to receive special treatment on public streets and sidewalks should strike 
any judge as obviously impermissible under First Amendment content 
analysis.  Indeed, this is the precise opposite of the neutrality test as applied 
in Mosley, the paradigmatic content-neutrality case.244  Yet three judges on 
the Fifth Circuit, in 2010, apparently saw no problem with the government 
regulating speech content in this way.  And judges in the other circuit courts 
and justices on the Supreme Court have recently made similar errors in the 
other contexts described above. 
We believe the only explanation for courts viewing these speech 
restrictions as “neutral” is that they are no longer applying the standard 
content-neutrality inquiry.  Instead, they are applying a severely weakened 
neutrality analysis, which has been subtly distorted over time by the 
secondary effects doctrine.  The result is that courts tend to be satisfied by 
the mere assertion of a neutral-sounding motive, and allow that neutral-
sounding motive to crowd out other aspects of the neutrality inquiry, 
including a focus on the law’s application and justification. 
In this regard, the secondary effects doctrine is having the precise impact 
feared by its early critics.  It is creating the opportunity for governments to 
“single out favored messages” legally.  And whether this government 
favoritism occurs in parades, on public sidewalks near abortion clinics, on 
television, or in public schools, the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals 
are frequently allowing the favoritism to occur without triggering strict 
scrutiny.  So long as the government is savvy enough to couch the state 
interest as neutral, there is a good chance a court can be convinced to find 
the law neutral.  In this manner, the content-neutrality inquiry is functioning 
less like “the keystone”245 holding First Amendment doctrine together, and 
more like a roadmap for governments to regulate speech selectively based 
on its content and even viewpoint while avoiding the compelling interest 
test. 
This is a serious problem in First Amendment doctrine and application.  
As the Court has repeatedly acknowledged, viewpoint discrimination is “an 
egregious form of content discrimination,” and the government should 
 
 242. Id. (alternation in original) (quoting Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 
(9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 243. Hoye, 653 F.3d at 851 (citing Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1128 (9th 
Cir. 2005)). 
 244. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 4, at 115 (deeming Mosley “perhaps the seminal decision 
distinguishing content-based and content-neutral restrictions”). 
 245. Kagan, supra note 15, at 449. 
1234 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
never be permitted to engage in it.246  Yet as the recent cases discussed 
above demonstrate, the courts of appeals are often using the weakened 
content-neutrality analysis even to permit viewpoint discrimination in the 
public forum. 
The good news, however, is that the problem is not yet universal, and the 
harm from the doctrinal shift described above can be addressed. 
The optimal way to address the problem is for the Supreme Court to take 
a case—or series of cases—to address directly the doctrinal damage created 
by the secondary effects doctrine.  Doing so would require several steps.  
First, the Court should grant certiorari in a case to clarify that the express 
use of the secondary effects doctrine is limited to so-called “low value” 
speech and cannot be applied beyond that context.  The Court should look 
for a case that expressly invokes the doctrine in the context of core political 
speech.  As discussed in Part II.A.3 supra, these cases do arise from time to 
time. 
Second, the Court should also clarify—in the next content-neutrality case 
it decides—that the “principal inquiry” statement from Ward is a 
misstatement.  What the Court presumably meant was that the “principal 
target” of the content inquiry is laws that discriminate based on 
disagreement with the message.  But calling an analysis of motive the 
“principal inquiry” confuses means with ends.  As Justice Kagan rightly 
noted, a content-neutrality inquiry that focuses on such direct inquiries into 
motive is avoided too easily to do any real work.  The Court’s recent grant 
of certiorari in the McCullen case offers an opportunity to make this 
correction. 
Third, the Court should also correct its obvious overstatement from Ward 
that a law is neutral so long as it serves “purposes unrelated to the content 
of expression.”  A law that bans all civil rights marches would of course 
protect some purposes unrelated to the content of expression, as it would 
reduce litter and traffic congestion.  But the law would still be obviously 
content based and should be treated as such. 
Fourth, the Court should correct its past statements suggesting that 
Renton offers a valid example of a law that is “justified without reference to 
the content of speech.”  The entire point of the secondary effects doctrine is 
that there are certain effects that come with speech of a certain content.  
Thus Renton’s secondary effects approach should rightly be viewed as an 
exception to the justified without reference inquiry.  Allowing Renton to 
continue to be used in this regard essentially allows the secondary effects 
doctrine to be read into the rest of the neutrality inquiry in a way that no 
majority of the Court has ever embraced. 
There are good reasons to believe that the Supreme Court would be 
prepared to make these corrections and directly address the problems that 
 
 246. “The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating 
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (emphasis 
addded). 
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are becoming apparent in the courts of appeals.  Over the past several years, 
the Court has taken a variety of cases to clarify questions of First 
Amendment doctrine.247  Furthermore, with Justice Kagan’s arrival, the 
Court now also has within its midst a prominent academic critic of allowing 
the neutrality inquiry to be a direct inquiry into motive.248 
If the Supreme Court does not address the doctrinal problems directly, 
lower courts still have some room within existing case law to apply a proper 
content-neutrality inquiry.  Because the doctrinal problems we have 
discussed have occurred subtly, they have left in place a host of strong 
content-neutrality cases that have never been overruled and are still widely 
accepted as valid law.  Thus, courts confronted with content-neutrality 
questions are perfectly able to rely upon Mosley, O’Brien, Eichman, 
Johnson, Clark, and other cases that do not use the weakened content 
analysis described above.  This is how the Ninth Circuit in Hoye reached 
the correct result on the abortion clinic speaker question (the Ninth Circuit 
relied on the principles from Mosley) while the First Circuit erred (because 
it applied the weakened Renton-driven content approach and ignored 
Mosley).  The Supreme Court’s decision last term in Sorrell provides yet 
another example of a strong content analysis, which lower courts can and 
should use as a model going forward. 
Nearly three decades ago, when the Court announced the secondary 
effects doctrine, it was widely believed that doctrine would severely 
undermine the First Amendment.  As detailed above, it has done so, just 
more slowly and quietly than most commentators have realized.  The 
damage has occurred through Supreme Court decisions that, whether 
deliberately or not, incorporated the secondary effects approach into the 
standard content-neutrality inquiry.  The Court needs to take deliberate 
action now to reverse that damage and restore the neutrality test to its 
proper strength. 
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